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Military Affairs

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CONTENTS

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

Role, Problems of Restructuring Examined	1
Behavior of Corrupt Political Officer Described	1
Improved Political Training Called For	3
Attention to 'Restructuring' Threatens Officer's Career	4
'Show' Regiment Goes Counter to Restructuring	6
Abuses of Atmosphere of Restructuring Criticized	8
Restructuring in Komsomol Work	10
Need for Restructuring in DOSAAF Primary Organizations	11
Dispute Between Unit Commander, Party Secretary Described	13
Role of Political Workers in Improving Flight Safety	17

MILITARY SCIENCE

Conventional Weapons of Destruction	22
---	----

WARSAW PACT

Yazov Writes on Pact Military Doctrine [Dmitriy Yazov; Moscow <i>INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS</i> , No 10, Oct 87]	23
--	----

ARMED FORCES

Obituary: Col Gen Avn V. D. Lavrinenkov	27
---	----

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

U.S. Research on Improvement of Accuracy of SLBMs	28
---	----

Role, Problems of Restructuring Examined

Behavior of Corrupt Political Officer Described

18010101 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Oct 87 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Tasyakin: "What is the Limit of Condescension?"]

[Text] The letter was alarming. It stated that Capt 3d Rank I. Toptygin, deputy division commander for political affairs, was abusing his position and conducting a dissipated way of life. Here are a few lines: "It reached the point that he and Seaman M. Gukasyan would go 'romping' together. The seaman is needed as a personal driver when Toptygin becomes thoroughly drunk. For this 'service' Gukasyan was granted leave. After a bout of drinking the officer even ended up in the hospital. There were also times when Toptygin and Warrant Officer V. Nikulshin went to the homes of subordinates and demanded food...."

I could not help but think: Is there not an anonymous author behind the six signatures? The facts grated sorely upon the ear and did not fit my views about the character of a political worker.

But the letter was not anonymous. When I met its authors they expressed readiness to confirm every line. Moreover, they brought up new facts that were not in the letter.

"They don't like my demandingness, and that is why they write," Capt 3d Rank Toptygin brushed aside all the accusations with firmness, leaving no place for the slightest doubts. "And as for drinking bouts—how is this possible? In my entire time there I permitted myself neither vodka, wine, nor a glass of beer."

He fell silent for a minute. And, wavering it seemed to me, added:

"You talk to people. Many will confirm my words."

I began with the division commander. It is true that he was very terse and restrained in his assessments, as if he was afraid to say too much.

After this conversation several unit workers and employees wished to speak with the correspondent. All spoke in defense of the political officer. The responses of electrician A. Fil and metalworker M. Klevak contained an especially large number of overly enthusiastic epithets, which somewhat set them aside from the overall tone. Warrant Officer G. Myndru, chief of the boatswain's technical warehouse, and an employee of the unit store, both spoke in the same spirit.

I met with sailors on the division's motor launches. Here as well I heard good about the deputy for political affairs. I recalled Seaman V. Samoylov, who was especially generous with his praise.

Does this mean that the letter to the editors was vicious slander, an attempt to blacken the political officer?

This is the time to discuss facts that the "defenders" of Toptygin so carefully avoided in their discussions. The division commander, for example, did not utter a word about the inclination of his deputy for political affairs toward alcohol. Many people commented about the officer being "tipsy." In the hospital documentary evidence was even found of the fact that Capt 3d Rank Toptygin was delivered there in a state of alcoholic intoxication. (How can one help but recall his words here, in which he said "God save me!" for drinking even a bottle of beer?)

It was as though there was also no statement by employees I. Belovol and N. Smakotina to the party organization, no party investigation or no record in communist Toptygin's personnel file.

Let us refer to the materials of the party investigation to complete the picture. "I first saw Toptygin in a state of heavy alcoholic intoxication in mid-September. He and Warrant Officer Rudenko went out for shashlik and returned in the evening. Rudenko was a bit high behind the wheel, and Toptygin could barely stand. On 9 December they got drunk on the occasion of the birthday of Warrant Officer Nikulshin. As a result he ended up in the hospital...." This is from the explanatory notes of Capt Lt A. Pomeschchikov.

"Without informing the appropriate officials, Toptygin granted the personnel leave to the village, after which the sailors frequently returned to the unit late, and sometimes intoxicated," we read in the explanatory statement of Capt Lt S. Bundin.

I can cite more and more examples. But is this necessary? I will add only what I. Belovol, the lady in charge of the library said:

"In six years of work I never saw such a crude and unfair deputy for political affairs. No matter where you work you hear the same thing constant dissatisfaction and bad language. After one instance it became absolutely unbearable. One day he and warrant officers Nikulshin and Derivolkov visited us. I set the table and hosted them as best I could. Now I cannot forgive myself that I offered them something to drink. They liked it and requested more. "You have good wine, hostess," they said. "Can we help ourselves?" It is awkward to show a boss the door. Again they sat at the table. And my husband and family had a great deal to do at home. Well, when they asked for more to drink for the third time, my husband could not stand it. He sent them away. After

this Toptygin made my life impossible. I cried so many tears. In six years I had not received a single punishment, and now immediately I became an unsuitable worker.

What is behind such a phenomenon? Is the man completely two-faced? Some assert that he is thoughtful and attentive; others that he is unfair, crude, and inclined toward drunkenness. Can this be so? The reader no doubt already understands that Toptygin is thoughtful and attentive toward those with whom he drinks and spends time, who are obliging and may be useful. And he has the exact opposite attitude toward those whom he "doesn't like." And the collective is split into two camps based on these relationships.

Seemingly, everything today facilitates healthy forces, which are implementing the ideas of restructuring, gaining the upper hand everywhere. Why was it so difficult in this unit for those who stood up against the "tricks" of this presumptuous leader?

Here one could state many reasons, but the main reason is that all of the "commanding heights," as we say, were in the hands of Toptygin's favorites. Here is a small feature, which discloses the principle of operation of the mechanism of "self-defense," of those who did not want to restructure themselves in the spirit of the times.

"I recall when they discussed Communist Toptygin's reference at a party conference," recalled the current party organization secretary, Sr Lt Medical Service A. Bairov. "Many communists stated directly that it was not objective. In particular, Pomeschchikov and Kalachik expressed serious criticism of Toptygin. But these remarks were ignored."

I will not cite the entire text of the reference, which has come to light and supposedly been confirmed. If it is to be believed, there is not a blemish on the reputation of the political officer. It is signed by Warrant Officer V. Nikulshin, party organization secretary. Can a drinking companion of Toptygin really allow a shadow to darken this "bright image?"

Much that was negative was disclosed during a party investigation held by Capt 2d Rank S. Topor. Communist Toptygin received a reprimand with notation in his registration card, and was removed from the party commission. Here is how representatives of the political department now see the political officer. I cite his service record: "Repeatedly misused alcoholic beverages. Displayed personal lack of discipline.... Had an immediate effect on the situation in the division.... His moral qualities are low."

Seemingly this would be everything and it would be possible to place a period at the end of this story. Who would dispute the fact that a man with such a collection of hardly the best qualities had completely lost the right to wear the rank of political officer?

However, the fact is that Capt 3d Rank Toptygin continues to serve in his former position.

"It would be a pity to discharge him; he has only a year and a half until his pension, and he has two children." I heard this phrase repeatedly in the political department.

The authors of the letter to the editor and any others asked the question legitimately: Why is it a pity for a drunken, morally besmirched officer, who obstructed indoctrinary work, committed disciplinary violations and discredited the rank of political officer, and it is not a pity for the people who suffered and today suffer so much from him?

Today, in the army and navy we correctly pose the question as follows: a political officer who does not facilitate restructuring, and is not able to lead it, is clearly out of place. What attitude must we have toward those who, through their misdeeds, place barriers upon restructuring, and consciously oppose it?

This thought is also troubling. More and more often one hears that some of today's political officers have lost something of the invaluable spiritual legacy that was left to them by the commissars of the Civil War and political officers of the Great Patriotic War. Moral reference points have washed off of some of them and the voice of conscience has become muffled.

Why is this so? That is a difficult question. But one thing has most definitely come to light. The period of stagnation left its imprint on much. This included the fact that a gap developed between the high demands always placed upon the character of a political worker, and the commonplace level of demandingness, which permits condescension and tolerance of all manner of deviations. This means that we must raise this "plank of demandingness," which is for us one of the most important directions of restructuring.

We must raise it. And we still at times observe condescension. As we did in this case.

Since the short time that I worked in the unit, numerous events of an alarming nature took place here. Capt Lt Pomeschchikov sent Seaman Samoylov, the same man who had praised the deputy for political affairs, and Petty Officer 1st Class S. Kolchin, who was expelled from the party for drunkenness, to the military prosecutor's office to be brought to their senses. Perhaps a warning from the prosecutor will have an effect on them. It did not have an effect on Seaman S. Dokuchayev, who had a drinking problem, and he, along with Seaman A. Zelenyak, again got drunk. Last year five misdemeanors occurred in the division, and in only five months of this year there have been 13. Can improvement be expected if the first name on the list of violators is the division political officer, who panders to them?

He is political officer only in terms of position. In spirit he has not been for a long time.

Improved Political Training Called For
18010101 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Oct 87 p 1

[Lead Article: "Political Training Group Leader"]

[Text] In developing the struggle for social renewal, the party begins from the belief that it is necessary to lay a firm foundation of conviction under this tremendous work. The most complete expression of this was found in the CPSU Central Committee resolution, "On Restructuring the System of Political and Economic Training of the Workers." This is the reason for the particular importance of the tasks which are facing ideological workers, including those in the army and navy. Perhaps the most numerous of their detachments consists of the leaders of the groups that conduct political training with soldiers, seamen, sergeants and petty officers.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance and scale of the task entrusted to them. Let us take merely the quantitative aspect. Every week four hours, and in the navy and military construction units three hours, are allotted to outside propagandists for the conduct of crucial political work with the personnel. It is not difficult to imagine how much time this amounts to in a year, or in the entire term of service of a soldier, and how substantial a program the soldiers and seamen should assimilate.

In short, the possibilities are tremendous. And the main thing is that political training everywhere is to be a school of ideological tempering and spiritual maturity. It is necessary to trample down formalism and dogmatism, primitivism and tedium. It is important that each lesson be interesting, vital and effective. This today is the great task of each political training group leader.

We have many propagandists whose words, strengthened by personal example and their entire way of life, possessed a tremendous strength of conviction. For example, Captains N. Astakhov and A. Dragunov, and Lt A. Galenyak, can be included fully in this number. The students in the groups that they lead completed the past training year with excellent indices, and are worthily greeting the 70th anniversary of Great October.

In the final analysis much depends on the group leader. It is necessary to raise decisively the level of work with this category of ideological aktiv. It is necessary to strengthen the practice of continuous participation of party committees and VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] committees in the selection and appointment of group leaders, their periodic recommendations in party and komsomol organizations, and monitoring the fulfillment of their duties. Four-hour seminars, held in units and on ships no less frequently than twice a month must become schools of political

erudition, political culture and methodological skill for them. Here the theoretical knowledge and methodological skills of the propagandists are perfected. Meanwhile, in a number of units such seminars are frequently still being prepared hastily and carried out according to the shortened program and in an unsystematic way. Not everywhere is the necessary attention being paid to beginning propagandists.

In the forces and fleets the system of monitoring the course of political training of the personnel is being improved. Unfortunately, from the standpoint of training the leaders of political training groups, this is not always beneficial. Instead of thorough, thoughtful and specific analysis of the content and method of the lesson, monitors frequently limit themselves to superficial comments about individual shortcomings. For example, this was observed in the units where majors V. Zaytsev and A. Lagstrem are serving. The decline in demandingness leads to a situation in which "honorary" group leaders appear, for whom subordinates write class conspectuses. It is necessary to struggle quite actively against such phenomena, and against indulgences in training lower level political officers.

The times are placing new demands on political training, and they are being set down in guidance documents. It is important that each group leader know that he is responsible not only for the level of training of his students, but also for their attitude toward military training and service, their exemplary discipline, and activeness in social matters. Indoctrinary aspects here are especially significant.

The problem of mastering active forms of conducting classes by all group leaders is very acute. It is necessary to get away from boring and dictatic monologues, and from lessons that recall school dictations. Dialog, discussion and problem-oriented situations are what the propagandists should use in each lesson. Practice shows that a significant number of group leaders still are weak in employing such means of exciting the interest of the audience. It is necessary to employ all forms of training propagandists, in order to solve this problem in the immediate future.

The faculties of political workers, and military pedagogues and psychologists at military educational institutions could greatly assist the political training group leaders. Today a shortage of interesting research efforts and methodological developments, in which the inquiry of our pedagogical science would be reflected, and innovative methods anticipated, is being especially felt. Some steps in this plane have already been taken, but this is just a beginning.

Some cultural and educational institutions also still owe a debt to the political training group leaders. They are not all giving them necessary assistance. The army and navy press must illuminate more thoroughly the problems of political training.

The CPSU Central Committee resolution, "On Restructuring the System of Political and Economic Training of the Workers," makes it incumbent upon commanders, political organs and party organizations to make thorough conclusions; create favorable conditions and a favorable environment for political training group leaders to carry out creative work and successfully accomplish their duties; and prevent them from being overburdened with other social assignments. It is necessary to improve forms of moral incentives for their conscientious and fruitful labor.

Each propagandist must comprehend thoroughly how important and crucial is the job entrusted to him. His words are to become a real force, which encourages the personnel to improve their field, naval and air training, and to strengthen discipline. This is possible only when there is an inseparable link between conviction and practical actions, a unity of words and deeds.

Attention to 'Restructuring' Threatens Officer's Career

18010101 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Nov 87 p 2

[Article by Maj S. Babayev: "Who is This Kazanskiy?"]

[Text] Lt Col V. Kazanskiy could not be found in the encampment.

"You'll have to wait a long time to find Valeriy Nikolayevich here," stated the regimental duty officer. "Look for him on the range. He is there day and night; it is a busy time, the end of the training year."

For some reason a surprising quiet was encountered at the range.

The reason was as follows. The party committee secretary arrived at the range at precisely the moment that Sr Lt A. Petrusenko, the company commander, was instructing the first group of firers, among whom were all the gunners.

"Have the company officers fired?" Kazanskiy asked first of all.

The secretary had the ability to ask "uncomfortable" questions. The officer became confused and began to argue inarticulately:

"To us the most important thing is to succeed in training the personnel...."

This is a familiar ruse. It was the subject of a recent party committee session. Analysis of materials prepared for the session showed that many young officers did not fire and did not drive tanks for months, and were losing previously acquired skills and also losing confidence in themselves.

Having completed the firing exercise, the first group returned to the line of departure. The company commander received an excellent rating; the party committee secretary and platoon commander received good ratings. Few of the young soldiers knew that Lt Col Kazanskiy, a former artilleryman, three or four years ago did not know from which side to approach an armored vehicle, not to mention how to fire or drive one. And now he is a class qualified specialist in his new specialty.

"No doubt this was the most difficult thing for you here in the regiment, to become a tanker?" I asked Kazanskiy later.

"No, something else was difficult," he answered, smiling mysteriously.

Valeriy Nikolayevich was seeing with his own eyes how his destiny, his good name and his party honor were being canceled by one stroke of the pen. His whole insides grew cold as if they had turned to stone. The party electoral meeting was taking its normal course, and for him time seemed to have slowed down. He could see only the severely knit brows of the general sitting next to him in the presidium, and the lines coming out from his pen in rounded, unhurried letters: "...I recommend that Lt Col Kazanskiy not be entered on the list for secret voting, as unable to handle the job...."

A quarter century of service under his belt; service without reproach. And now such a blow! It was painful, bitter and vexing.

The general again reread what had been written, beckoned one of the officers with a brief gesture and, handing him the note, said something softly. The officer nodded in understanding and quickly slipped out of the hall.

"As not able to handle the job," Valeriy Nikolayevich repeated to himself mechanically the phrase that was imprinted in his memory. It was for discipline. Yes, there were many gross violations in the unit. Here the figure was written in black india ink on a huge placard. In the not yet three years that he had been here, this was the first time.

However, if it was truly necessary to blame him, it was not because now the figure is high, but because in past years it was small. A paradox? Hardly.

Do they really now have more violations than, say, neighboring units? More likely to the contrary. But the black figure on the placard is larger. How much he had to fight so that it was not minimized, and so that it reflected the real situation. Restructuring is going on in the country, and the time had come to speak the truth about shortcomings, in order to combat them better. Cautious advisers had repeatedly given him "wise" counsel: "Are you not putting it on your own head, Valeriy Nikolayevich?" He was too straightforward. Yes, he argued to everyone, from regiment commander to lieutenant: If we

do not turn ourselves around now, do not stop hushing up shortcomings and concealing violations of discipline, we will not move forward. And this point of view was confirmed.

The officer that had left the hall approached the presidium table silently. Valeriy Nikolayevich could not know that the note that the general received expressed the opinion of the military council member, chief of the political directorate of the group of forces: "As the meeting decides."

And it was coming to an end.

The list of speakers was exhausted. The placing of candidatures on the list for secret voting had begun. His name was also pronounced. The general requested a word. Kazanskiy attempted with all his might to listen attentively and remember every word. But, as luck would have it, the words slipped across the surface of his consciousness. The main thing was clear: The senior comrade briefly and unambiguously suggested that the meeting participants not give a vote of confidence to their former secretary.

Instants. How heavy-laden they are. Valeriy Nikolayevich did not even suspect before how many thoughts, shades of feelings and half-tones of mood can be contained in these minute particles of time.

The decisive moment is at hand. It was as if there were invisible scales: on one side the suggestion of the higher commander, plus for each, no doubt, his own grudges, doubts, and disagreements, and on the other side—he.

The seconds dragged out endlessly. And not a single hand was raised for him.

However, now there is a stir in the deathly silence of the hall. A hand goes up. One. All alone. The hand of Sgt Vagid Shaditov.

He recalls how they washed the floor together when Shaditov had just arrived in the unit. Vagid was a Chechen, and he was hot tempered and proud. Education was having an affect on him. The soldier was ordered to bring order to the accommodations, and he objected, saying this was not a man's work. He turned red, there was fire in his eyes, and his muscles twitched. And at that moment the party committee secretary glanced over. He quickly realized what was happening. He said: You mean it is embarrassing for you as a man to do this kind of work, it is embarrassing for you to maintain your things in a clean way? But, who is to do this? There are two of us. Since you do not want to, I will have to. But will you not be ashamed of this, if you are from the Caucasus? My hair is gray, and I will wash the floor, and you, a young fellow, will rest?

He said this and himself took up the mop. Only Vagid did not allow him. He took it first. And from time to time the secretary showed him how to do it better. From that time on they had many heart-to-heart discussions. In time Shaditov became a deputy platoon commander and entered the party. And, Valeriy Nikolayevich assigned him to carry out much work with his fellow countrymen. The young man had fire in his heart, and he was honest.

Not far from the first hand, another is raised. Valeriy Nikolayevich glanced. It was Maj Valeriy Fedorovich Ivanov, a tank battalion deputy for political affairs. Not two months had passed since the party committee had given him a strict reprimand.

He was deservedly punished. Organic weapon's firing was going on. And as it all turned out, it was unclear by the end whether the battalion would get a three or a four. Everything was being determined literally in the final groups. Then he decided to make a substitution: Instead of a young gunner, he sent out an experienced one for a second time.

Valeriy Nikolayevich personally insisted that the matter reach the party committee and that the guilty parties receive a stricter punishment. Special demands, of course, are made upon a political officer.

And now his hand went up in the hall.

At this same instant Lt Col Kazanskiy caught in his lateral vision movement at the presidium table. A regiment commander raised his hand.

Their relationship had been difficult from the very outset. The newly arrived party committee secretary was not a tanker, and the commander decided that this one would be like his predecessor. He would rarely go to the range and tank range, and he would have to evaluate him at inspections based on his "pretty eyes." But it turned out otherwise. This lieutenant colonel, who was no longer young, turned out to be as lively as a young fellow, was not afraid to get his hands dirty, and was not ashamed to ask for explanations. In short, he successfully passed a very close inspection, receiving a "good" in driving and an "excellent" in firing. The regiment commander was glad that, as the saying goes, a man with character had come.

Only soon he was sorry about this. The commander himself is an energetic and impetuous man. If something was not just so he could punish in the heat of the moment. Moreover, he also attempted to order the party committee to bring someone or another to party responsibility. Then disputes began to arise between him and Lt Col Kazanskiy. Kazanskiy attempted to prove that it was necessary first of all to educate people. Each punishment is not merely a mark on a piece of paper, but a scar on the spirit, which burns a mark into a person's life.

Slowly the raised hands filled the hall. Kazanskiy looked around and it was no longer one or two, but dozens of people speaking up for him. And even this one. Can he really be "for"?

An incident that occurred during exercises was recalled. Maj I. Ponomarenko was riding in the technical maintenance echelon. It was a long and exhausting march. Lt Col Kazanskiy approached during one of the stops. When he was speaking with Ponomarenko he sensed a certain "smell."

Ivan Stepanovich at the time was especially resentful that one of "his own," from his regiment, had noticed. It would have been entirely possible to limit this to conversation. But Kazanskiy made noise. All of this ended up in a strict reprimand for communist Ponomarenko, with annotation in his service card. Then he was very resentful.

And now, it turns out, he raised his hand.

And Lt Vladimir Korobiy raises his hand. They became acquainted at an exercise in underwater swimming training.

It was a sunny summer day. The party committee secretary approached the exercise location, greeted the persons present and looked around. He saw a soldier standing to the side and crying. No one seemed to be looking after him. He called to him and began to ask what was the matter. He answered that he was afraid of the water.

Then Lt Korobiy, the platoon commander, approached. Nothing was working with him, and the only thing to do was to throw him forcibly into the water.

Valeriy Nikolayevich winked at him, saying leave us alone for now. And he continued to talk with the soldier. They even talked on seemingly diverse topics. Then he says:

"This means you don't trust the apparatus?"

The soldier nodded.

"Then let me dive in your mask. OK? And you dive after me. Agreed?"

He took out everything from his pockets, hitched up the halyard, took the track link in his hands and plunged into the water.

After the lieutenant colonel did it the soldier was not so terrified.

"It is unanimous!" states the meeting chairman.

And in the secret voting not a single communist crossed out his name.

The one-time lagging regiment is now on the rise. This was stated in the military soviet of the group of forces. And this is to the credit not only of the new commander, but of all the officers and communists, and to a considerable extent of the party committee secretary. His co-workers cite his services frankly. And they still call him the conscience of the regiment. In the political directorate of the group of forces he is said to be the best party committee secretary.

And what does the best mean today? No doubt it is that for which both people and the times themselves vote.

'Show' Regiment Goes Counter to Restructuring
18010101 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Nov 87 p 2

[Article by Col V. Bogdanovskiy, Carpathian Military District: "How the Regiment 'Consolidated'"]

[Text] I have known this regiment for a long time. And this sign in its life had appeared for some time. It would happen that one would not even become acquainted with some officer, and he already had in his hands an order to leave for a new place of service. In principle there was something surprising about this. For a military man a transfer in position is a natural thing. But the officers in the regiment had a somewhat different opinion about this movement of cadres in their unit.

A year ago the question arose before the workers of the cadre organ about selecting a candidate for a vacant position. Lt Col M. Tsygankov was selected.

However, not a year had passed when it turned out that, despite all his merits, Tsygankov did not justify their hopes. Therefore, a new order came about transferring the officer.

There is something similar in the story of Lt Col A. Goncharov. After completing the academy, he had not been in the position of regiment chief of staff for even a year, and is now already working in another unit, and is fulfilling lesser duties. Maj V. Tsegelnik, a battalion commander, has recently been given a lower duty position.

The complaints made against these officers, as they themselves acknowledge, were not without reason. Nevertheless, they left the unit with a feeling of bitterness. They had put in so much work, and done so much in order to understand their new positions and master their duties. It is true that at times not everything went smoothly, and they lacked experience. But, it has long been known that experience is a matter of time. Undoubtedly the people who decided the fate of lieutenant colonels Tsygankov and Goncharov, and Maj Tsegelnik also understand this. And had this discussion been about some other regiment, the officials there would wait a little while with their decision. In any other regiment, but not here. And this is why.

In its time the district headquarters spared no forces and resources to turn the regiment (considering that it is quite nearby) into a demonstration regiment, so to speak, in all respects. The barracks, soldiers' mess hall and other buildings and facilities were re-equipped in haste. Lace curtains appeared in the windows, hard-cover roads were built in the fields. In the barracks were rest corners with aquariums and parrots.

There were always guests in the regiment. And favorable remarks were heard from almost all the men. If one looked it truly was so. But each time it became more difficult to be a demonstration unit.

The majority of officers and warrant officers in the unit did not spare themselves in their service. However, more and more often they began to note that their efforts were directed at the demonstration side of matters. The personnel began to be taken away for special details—strengthening the material base was required. Classes were switched and disrupted in connection with this. Little by little military training was put on the back-burner.

Having sensed this situation, representatives of the military district headquarters often came here. It was necessary to stabilize the situation as quickly as possible. But into what did this "zeal develop?" There was always an officer from higher headquarters next to the subunit commander in tactical exercises, who was prepared to intervene at the slightest complication of the situation. Frequently he even took the initiative in his own hands entirely. It got to the point that officers from higher headquarters prepared, instead of the platoon and company commanders, on the eve of firing and driving weapons and equipment.

The status of a demonstration unit cost the regiment dearly. But, no matter how bitter the lesson, the officers hoped that now they would understand at higher headquarters that nothing should be altered by emergency work, and that finally independence would be granted to commanders and the schedule of lessons would become law. But, alas! Some comrades at district headquarters sought the reasons for the failures elsewhere.

The first decision was to fortify the subunits with intelligent officers. And searches for worthy candidates began immediately. Lt Col Tsygankov became one of them, as was already stated. It is true that he was not the first and not the last.

The fourth chief of staff and third commander in the last two years alone are already working. Recently Lt Col V. Volkov took the position of deputy regiment commander for armaments, instead of Lt Col F. Rakityanskiy. Numerous other rearrangements also took place. And how did this affect the situation in the unit?

"I will not hide the fact," states Lt Col V. Kovalenko, who worked directly with Rakityanskiy, that the former deputy for armaments made mistakes. But who doesn't make them in our regiment, when at times we do not know what we will be doing an hour from now? There are new instructions one after another. But, Rakityanskiy also possessed numerous positive qualities, and was able to work. I do not want to make hasty conclusions about Lt Col Volkov, but so far the change has not been an equal one. It is difficult for the officer himself, and it is no easier for us.

In large part these difficulties are understandable. Restructuring has demanded of each leader bold and initiative-filled actions, and a high degree of responsibility and competence. Not all are equally prepared for this, and both a subunit commander and an officer at regiment headquarters has his own difficulties. But on the other hand, restructuring also demands a thoughtful approach toward work with cadres, and constant attention to their selection, placement and upbringing. What are the senior officers, on whom the establishment of officers in the regiment largely depends, undertaking in this regard?

Lt Col B. Servirov had not been able to master the duties of regiment chief of staff, and demonstrated rather an "example" of how not to conduct oneself and serve, when he was immediately named to a higher position. It was not possible to obtain any explanation of this matter. Being in the district cadre directorate, it is true that they hinted to me. It was, they said, a direct instruction "from above," but to try to prove something in those days was not customary. Moreover, they said, is it worthwhile to stir up the past? Servirov has already been removed from his new duty as well, and placed in the reserve.

It is, of course, also possible not to recall this cadre error, but its consequences recall it in and of themselves. It is no accident that they spoke unambiguously in the collective that some officers, despite all their shortcomings and even serious lapses, remained positively "unsinkable," and with others conversation is brief.

They discussed in evidence of this the story of Capt N. Popelskiy, who was transferred to an equivalent position in another unit without any explanation. The officer had fulfilled with honor the harsh school of Afghanistan, and was awarded the Order of the Red Star. Already he had brought first a platoon, and then a company up to the leaders in the regiment. He was a member of the party committee, and secretary of the battalion party organization. And suddenly he was transferred. Why? What was the reason? I could not get a clear answer to this question in the regiment, the division, or the district cadre directorate.

To be frank, at first I took as a very bad joke the "version" of one regimental officer that Capt Popelskiy simply "did not show his true worth to someone." But then I began to think seriously: Perhaps this is truly the bitter truth?

Officer A. Novgorodtsev is remembered well in the regiment. They know how highly the senior officers assessed his ability to render an account in a timely manner and command in a loud voice. The officer himself also caught this point. His duty position quickly rose, but still more quickly rose his desire to be first to report on his successes, and to relate the desirable as the real. Either this was not noticed or the impression was given that it was not noticed. And the officer came to believe that anything was permitted. And this unusually rapid advancement ended up with the officer being reduced in military rank, and then discharged from the army.

Where were those people who promoted the officer, and why did they not examine the shortcomings that in time more and more took root in his work? Of course bearing and an athletic build always are winning traits in a military man. But, what he does is so much more important. I must repeat this well-known truth because not so long ago the stately build of Lt S. Pisarenkov again caught someone's eye. And he was immediately named to the position of company commander. Six months later he was transferred to a lesser position.

What is taking place in the regiment today, what conclusions have been drawn from past mistakes, and what is changing in its work with cadres?

"No changes are apparent," states Maj S. Yershov, a battalion commander. "Verbally we are required to improve our study of people, and to raise the professional training level of officers, but in fact "give-give", tutelage, dressing down and "organizational conclusions" continue. Other regimental officers also spoke about this. By the way, they said that, of course, the help of senior officers is needed, and an authoritative opinion, or advice from a representative of higher headquarters is frequently simply required. But, on the other hand, what is the benefit from such advice if, for example, just as lieutenants in the past went to exercises as passengers, they are still doing so. They are even permitted to work with means of communication turned only on receive—[since] if someone makes a mistake, it will affect the evaluation.

I think I can understand why lieutenant colonels Tsygankov and Goncharov, as well as many other officers, left the regiment with such bitterness and resentment.

In conclusion I must state this. I have heard the opinion that the changes in the regiment were dictated by the interests of restructuring. But can the "cadre checkers," which is taking place in the regiment have anything in to do with restructuring?

Abuses of Atmosphere of Restructuring Criticized
18010101 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Nov 87 p 2

[Article by Col V. Kostko, Southern Group of Forces:
"Slander With an Official Stamp"]

[Text] The chairman of the examination commission from the Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin that was operating in the group of forces concentrated carefully on the text of the letter.

It concerned Capt L. Shangin, deputy commander of a motorized rifle battalion for political affairs, who had just successfully passed the entrance exam. It appeared from the letter, signed by Maj A. Radchenko, the battalion commander, and a number of other comrades, that Capt Shangin was not deserving of being a student at the military-political VUZ. Arguments were made. The colonel from the academy was troubled and alerted by the fact that, in another document, his efficiency report, given to the captain a month ago and also signed by the battalion commander, exactly the opposite was stated. The deputy for political affairs by all parameters, so to speak, was given the highest rating. It was for this reason that the commission chairman, having invited Shangin for a talk, began with leading questions:

"How do you get along with the battalion commander?"

"We get along fine," answered the captain.

"Then tell me, does he often perhaps change his views, his assessments?"

"Aleksandr Ivanovich is famous for the consistency of his actions and thinking," answered Shangin just as certainly.

Then the colonel showed the officer the letter. If one were to say that after he read the letter Shangin felt as though someone had suddenly poured a bucket of ice water over him, it would be an understatement. Never before in his almost 30 years had he experienced such sharp bitterness. The letter was malicious, perfidious, and most importantly untrue. The letter stated that the political officer undermined the authority of the commander and was crude toward his subordinates.

There were signatures below the text of the letter. First was the flowery hand of the battalion commander. Then Maj V. Petrov, senior lieutenants V. Piskun, A. Golubkin and S. Moroz, and Warrant Officer A. Shevchuk signed, indicating their general opinion of the political officer. To be convincing, perhaps, the text of the letter was certified by an official stamp, which, as was learned, was made by Lt Col Sh. Musayev, the unit chief of staff.

When, at the request of the chairman of the examination commission, Col V. Vypov, an officer from the cadre department of the group of forces political directorate checked the letter, I joined him. While the court examination was going on Capt Shangin did not find a place for himself. Everything in the letter was a lie, but was it suddenly working? And still he was bewildered why the attitude toward him on the part of his comrades had changed so abruptly.

During discussions with the authors of the letter, one after another the accusations advanced against Shangin collapsed, and it was becoming clear that everything that was written could be called nothing other than slander. In the end all those who had signed agreed, some with difficulty, and others with relief.

But what caused this story with the letter? Here a short excursion into the past is necessary. At one time the battalion commander submitted up the chain of command a request to be admitted to a military academy for study. Permission was obtained. Maj A. Radchenko prepared painstakingly for the exam, and made plans for the future. But it happened that twice during inspections the battalion received low marks, for which the commander was directly at fault. In view of this the senior commander decided to wait a while before sending the battalion commander to school. Meanwhile, this gave the unit command the opportunity to send one of the political officers to the academy.

Capt L. Shangin was selected. And, although he became the student entering the VUZ largely as a result of what had taken place, Radchenko did not look very kindly upon this event. To some extent this was understandable. Immediately before the deputy for political affairs departed, the battalion commander decided to bring Capt A. Sorochkin to a comrade's court of six junior officers, for misuse of alcoholic beverages. Shangin considered this measure somewhat premature. When Sorochkin came to him for help, Shangin did not defend the guilty officer. He openly expressed his negative attitude about his behavior, although he also promised to speak with the commander about holding the final trial after he returned from leave. The political officer had not yet seen the commander with his proposal, when Sorochkin already went there, and with his customary thoughtlessness stated, distorting the truth: "The deputy for political affairs, by the way, is on my side."

Without learning the truth of the matter, the battalion commander flared up and said roughly that Shangin was acting in defiance of him. Thus, a coolness developed between them. And then, after the next almost two-hour long meeting, Shangin properly stated to Aleksandr Ivanovich that it would be a good idea to "condense" the meetings. Radchenko made a wry face, but nevertheless promised: "Let us reduce them to a minimum." Someone heard this brief conversation and the authors of the letter took the situation to be undermining the authority of the commander.

"Well," the reader will say, "now it is clear. Radchenko started everything." I will acknowledge that at first it seemed so to us as well. But gradually everything fell into place. This occurred when we deciphered the essence of the second accusation, about disrespect and crudeness toward his subordinates. It turns out that several times,

in conversations with Maj V. Petrov, a battalion chief of staff, Capt L. Shangin, indignant about his alcoholic "exploits," warned him that the results could be deplorable.

Petrov nursed a grudge. It was he who organized the letter. He first signed the name of the absent battalion commander. He himself signed under the written text. He invited Warrant Officer A. Shevchuk, who by this time had been removed from the ranks of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] to sign. Here is a feature of the question of the moral face of this "fighter" for justice!

Lowering their eyes, senior lieutenants V. Piskun and A. Golubkin admitted that they had signed the letter "without thinking." And perhaps they had done so after having thought about it? After all, the battalion commander had signed. And both were nearing the time to be awarded their next military rank. Apparently they wanted to "play up to" the commander.

As far as the signature of Sr Lt S. Moroz, it should be stated that it, like that of the battalion commander, was forged. At the time that the letter was composed the officer was on a trip.

Lt Col Sh. Musayev, who as was already stated, placed the official stamp on the slanderous document, completed the matter. It is to be supposed that he was not entirely honest at the headquarters party organization party buro session when he fervently confessed that he "allowed himself to be persuaded." No, he did not commit a mechanical act. In placing the official stamp, Musayev legitimated a lie. Moreover, it is known that, intentionally or not, he encouraged Petrov, lamenting that it was not Radchenko who was sent to the academy, but "this kid." One wonders whether the shortcomings that were revealed during the inspection of the battalion might not have arisen partially through the fault of the unit headquarters?

The regiment party meeting dotted all the "i's". It confirmed the decision of the party buros about giving a strict reprimand with annotation in their service cards to communists Sh. Musayev and V. Petrov, and indicated the lack of principles of those communists who signed their names to an obvious falsehood.

However, broader conclusions must also be drawn from what happened. This is not the only instance when the processes of restructuring have been misinterpreted and used selfishly. There are those who believe that the atmosphere of glasnost and democratization can be adapted for the achievement of one's own egoistic goals. This is a simple matter. Trust in the individual's opinion, and all the more so in the collective opinion, has increased. At times one is amazed when one or another comrade, who is clearly incorrect, and is clearly an idler, who violates the requirements of military regulations and moral norms, sets about to "beat the drum," and to

write or make statements about persecution or unfairness, when he should be made to answer in full strictness. Everything is on the face of it incorrect, but how much energy is spent on this "counteroffensive!" The demagogue, of course, is counting on our credulity. Attention toward the individual is a requirement of restructuring. But, just as strictly it requires high principles and firm demands.

Restructuring in Komsomol Work

18010101 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Nov 87 p 2

[Article by Sr Lt O. Rodionov, VLKSM committee secretary, air defense missile battalion, North Caucasus Military District: "Do Not Fall out of Step"]

[Text] Imagine what an avalanche of paper could have broken out in our komsomol committee, had an unexpected breath of air taken place there in this way a year ago! What documents we prepared in order to "react" on time to requests from above! And we went to see people whenever we let go of our pens. Now this is even uncomfortable to recall.

It goes without saying that today the amount of paperwork has become much less, and that restructuring is knocking persistently at our door. They have begun to demand fewer various reports, and the style of work is changing. Recently Capt S. Yermakov, senior instructor in the komsomol department of the district political directorate, came to the unit. He talked with the activists, visited classes and became involved in the concerns of the lieutenants. And as he left, as if it had just occurred to him, he stated:

"Thank you, it was very interesting. Only I did not see your plans and protocols. Well, no matter, next time...."

Of course, our plans, protocols and other documents were completely in order. But, the very form of the work of the representatives from the political directorate was very welcome by many. Instead of fault-finding interrogatory, there was favorably disposed communication. Instead of reprimands and scoldings, there was specific assistance. It was as though we saw our organization, and our work as well, through other eyes.

Alas, we are schooled to react to the remarks of any inspector according to the formula, "we are guilty; we will correct it." But, how often there is a lack of free, mutually beneficial exchange of opinions, and wise advice and support. Namely support! For example, now we are preparing materials and photographs for the local press in the soldiers' homes, and are making representations to the raykoms, obkoms and central committees of the union republics, on the awarding of certificates of merit to outstanding soldiers. The benefit from this is great, and the work is pleasant. One always likes to talk with feeling about a good soldier, warrant officer or officer. One does not drown in such papers!

We talk a lot about new approaches in the indoctrination of young people, and ourselves often are still in the prison of old views and instructions. Let us take just the frequency of komsomol meetings. What is there to say. The specifics of the service of PVO [Air Defense] soldiers leave this impression. At times it is very difficult to gather even a quorum, and it is necessary to tear the specialists away from their work. And, although it is stated in a certain document that in battalion level komsomol organizations that are granted the authority of primary organizations, general meetings are convened no less frequently than once every two months, at times we still bend over backwards to meet every month. I shared my thoughts with Communist Maj A. Magomedov, and he answered:

"We did not institute it and it is not for us to change."

Why, namely, is it not for us to change? I understand that there are important and urgent questions that must be decided effectively. But, I think that it is entirely unnecessary to gather the komsomol members with such pangs and harm to military training for the sake of a notorious checkmark in the plan. After all, other forms of work exist. And if we do not fulfill the decision without thinking, but are concerned about the effectiveness of the komsomol measure, there will simply be more benefit. I am convinced that the command and the higher level political organs will always approve suggestions that come from life, and are made in the spirit of restructuring.

I would also like to express what may be a contentious thought. This is about the procedure for the paying of komsomol dues. As the specific nature of our service convincingly shows, it is better when the secretaries of the komsomol buros do this. But, as a rule, the komsomol committee secretaries fulfill these functions. This is supposedly "in order to be closer to the people." But I become further from them, running with the list and a clinking box of small change. Is this not an echo of the formalistic approach to working with young people that was condemned at the 20th VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Conference?

Perhaps I will be criticized: For Rodionov all restructuring amounts to is to reduce his own duties. It is not this I am complaining about. My main concern is to raise the authority of our komsomol organization. What else troubles me? One thing is the condescending and ironic attitude toward us by some senior comrades. This is still manifested rather often. In our battalion, unfortunately, the question of party guidance of the komsomol has never been directly examined at party meetings or party buro sessions. No communists, except, I believe, Warrant Officer V. Ryzhkov, the political officer, and the battalion first sergeant, have been present at our meetings. One time I expressed my bewilderment and Lt Col N. Orekhovskiy reacted:

"My head is spinning even without your problems."

Perhaps it is "spinning" because he does not know our problems?

Speaking self-critically, I still lack persistence in bringing my ideas to a conclusion, commitment, or something of the sort. Although I understand perfectly well that today we do not need commitment that is not buttressed by knowledge, by the ability to see not the task "in general," but the task "in particular," not the masses, but the specific living individual. It is difficult to break one's own habits, yesterday's psychology, and to learn to work in a new way. But it is necessary. Who today needs commitment without this?

I will give an old, but instructive example. It stays in my memory like a sore splinter. This is what I am talking about. Private A. Alekseyev submitted a statement to the komsomol organization requesting that he be excluded from the ranks of the VLKSM. I was taken aback to learn about this. A talk with Alekseyev explained little. He either fell silent, or repeated one in the same phrase, that he was giving this komsomol....

We discussed this "non-standard" question in the committee, and gave the soldier a good reprimand. And now I looked at this episode as if from the side, and it became uncomfortable. No, I am not taking under my protection, an even less justifying Alekseyev. It is easiest of all to testify to my own passivity. But I am convinced that we should not have bustled about giving exhortations as the first thing, but again should have concerned ourselves about how to raise the professional and moral authority of the komsomol organization; if you wish, its working reputation. After all, it is no secret that the meetings most often resemble rehearsed performances. We try to safeguard ourselves against criticism. From the rostrum we said one thing, but in our narrow circle something else. It is no wonder that the spirit of the young man was broken and that he lost faith due to our red tape. Persons entering the ranks of the VLKSM write in their statements: "I want to be in the front ranks...." But in fact what happens is that he entered, but everything in his life remained as before.

Alekseyev was discharged into the reserves. And to this day I have a bitter aftertaste in my mouth. We were unable to raise this man up in his own eyes. And the main reason was that there was too much formalism in the work of the komsomol organization.

Now, of course, we strive to approach work with youth in a different way. We evaluate that which is done in the interests of military training, discipline and moral indoctrination with the strict measure of restructuring. The commander supports us. After one of the komsomol raids [sudden inspections] I got ahold of a photograph of Private I. Gorin. It turned out that the man led a double life. Beyond the confines of the unit he conducted himself with undue familiarity and disgraced our army uniform. Gorin had to give up his komsomol card. But

again this is a signal to all the aktiv. At times we judge our co-workers purely by their external signs, and do not know their thoughts and frames of mind. This leads to blunders.

Yes, restructuring in the komsomol does not forgive the slightest hitches. In difficult moments I have thought that perhaps I would leave the komsomol organization and request my previous duty position. But I do not want to deceive myself. I could hardly get by anymore without these young people's concerns, and without these vexations and joys.

Thinking about this, I suddenly recalled a class on drill training. Some soldiers were timidly working on steps in place, while others were precisely and confidently marching about the parade ground. They were moving forward. The comparison, I'm afraid, is not so successful, but it seems to me that our komsomol work has moved off of dead center, is gathering speed and is becoming attractive. Only, once in a while we suddenly shift to marching in place, and are knocked off our feet.

Need for Restructuring in DOSAAF Primary Organizations

18010101 Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
29 Nov 87 p 2

[Article by V. Balabin: "Flaws in Control"]

[Text] When we speak about restructuring in our defense society, and analyze its course, most often we concentrate attention solely on the assigned workers of committees, educational organizations and sports and technical clubs.

Today, however, the times are posing new tasks. Therefore, the question resounds ever more persistently and sharply: How are we restructuring or thinking about restructuring at our foundation, the primary organization? After all, it is here as nowhere else that self-activity, initiative and creativity, and most of all enthusiasm are needed, without which forward moving social work is meaningless.

In short, restructuring the primary organization in a new way, and making it a true center of mass defense work, is a difficult and troublesome task. And many committees are still timid about this, and are putting off its decision, placating themselves by arguing that it is not worthwhile to increase the burdens of those who are working so intensely, and moreover, voluntarily and without pay.

Although, it is necessary to speak not about increasing the burdens on one individual, but about expanding and bringing up an aktiv that is capable of really getting down to business. But, the fetters of inertia still hold many people back. That is why there are frequently vexatious flaws in the activity of the rayon and city committees in guiding the primary organizations.

Unfortunately, the electoral conference confirms this, and the Zelenogradskiy DOSAAF [All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy of the USSR] Rayon Committee in the city of Moscow also did not avoid such flaws. The committee report, presented by its chairman, M. Kibkalov, was self-critical and basically disclosed the state of mass defense, military-patriotic and sports work. But, the central topic, the lives of the primary organizations and guidance to them, was poorly examined.

There are 111 primary organizations in the rayon. There are a sport shooting club and 17 shooting ranges. The STK [Technical Supervisory Service] in the motor vehicle depot, and the Raduga Factory STK are functioning actively. In a number of primary organizations rifle, radio-technical, aviation and automotive, parachute, water motor sports and underwater swimming sections are functioning. Six collective radio stations and a working dog-handling club have been created.

In the general educational schools where military instructors M. Shemyakin, I. Osmanov, S. Savitskiy, N. Fokichev, A. Lvovich and others are committee chairman, they are getting ever more deeply involved in the practice of military-patriotic indoctrination, and are conducting interesting lessons in courage, and trips to places of revolutionary, military and labor glory.

The work of survey groups, museums and history corners is being improved. Ceremonial sendoffs of inductees and meetings of soldiers discharged into the reserves have become traditional in some enterprises.

In general, the rayon DOSAAF organization has acquired a certain experience, and has an organizational and material-technical base, that with efficient guidance from the committee enables it to conduct mass defense work much better.

From the committee report:

"The DOSAAF raykom has not achieved a fundamental turning point in its work. We were extremely weak in explaining the goals, tasks and capabilities of the primary defense organizations. Often we lulled ourselves with the thought that measures directed at military-patriotic indoctrination are also planned by the komsomol, trade unions and other societies. But we do not know how these plans are accomplished. We have still not gotten rid of formalism in admitting individuals to DOSAAF membership.

The conference delegates did not hear in the report a detailed analysis of the working style of the raykom or the members of its presidium. Perhaps this was because the permanent workers, the raykom chairman and his deputy, took on the main burden of the work. Mikhail Moiseyevich is an experienced leader with heartfelt interest in the work, and is a bold and principled

communist. But, even possessing such outstanding qualities, he cannot be everywhere himself. For example, judging by the report, only he and his deputy, A. Yakovlev, carried out individual work with the aktiv of the primary organizations. With such an apportionment of forces it is hard to avoid mistakes or to find the best ways in the struggle for restructuring.

Nothing was said about how the DOSAAF raykom permanent commissions were working. After all, they are being created especially to study topical problems and to prepare proposals on the main directions of the activity of the rayon defense organization. Such help in seeking new approaches must be used today.

In order to raise the role of elected organs in the restructuring of mass defense work, it is necessary to put into action all of the potential of the committee, to seek and find assistance, to study the situation in the primary organizations, to become involved in their concerns and needs, and to understand all the fine points of guiding their activity.

From the speech by radio sportsman A. Kovalchuk:

"The raykom is of no help in the technical equipaging of collective radio stations. Only two out of six stations in the city are operating. And their activity is not high. Radio enthusiasts no longer believe that the raykom can solve the problem of acquiring the necessary apparatuses. I propose that the work of the raykom be recognized as unsatisfactory.

During the voting the delegates did not support this proposal, but everyone agreed with the criticism. This must cause the leaders to think: Is the request of the radio enthusiasts so impossible to fulfill? Was this question posed to the DOSAAF Moscow Gorkom? How are supply and accounting set up? How attentive is the raykom to the needs and requests of people? In the report of the revision commission, its chairman, V. Lobyzov, presented a rather detailed report on inspections of the financial and economic activity of the raykom, and the storage of sports weapons and cartridges. But did they check the observance of the time periods and correctness of the resolution of proposals, statements and complaints, and the organization of the reception of visitors in the committee apparatus? Nothing specific was stated about this.

From the speech by P. Solovyev, committee chairman of a DOSAAF primary organization:

I would like for the qualitative advances to become more noticeable after this conference. Veterans remember how energetically and enthusiastically the Osoaviakhim [Society for Assistance to the Defense, Aviation and Chemical Construction of the USSR] cells worked in their day. And we today are lagging. We must learn

quickly what we lost and where we lost it. Let us say that we in an enterprise decided to create a parachute section. For girls and not a single boy entered it. What does this mean?

The passivity of some young people and their lack of attraction toward sports with military application could be explained as a negative influence of the period of stagnation. But, I believe that the primary reason should be thought in our own DOSAAF organization, and in the nature of the work of its committee.

The report contained little specific about the problems of the primary organizations, and did not disclose thoroughly how the raykom guided their work and what was being done in the interests of restructuring. Not even a brief analysis was given of the electoral campaign that had taken place in the low-level organizations. What were the results and conclusions, tendencies, and prospects for the future? What forces do the elected committees possess and how are they being modernized? What makes them happy and what alarms them? All of this remains insufficiently stated. And was this not because the young delegates (workers, schoolchildren and other pupils) were silent at the conference? No one used the available microphone in the hall. And there were things to talk about. There are still many shortcomings and omissions in military-patriotic indoctrination, and in preparing young men for military service. It is necessary to act and eliminate them as quickly as possible. And the raykom has the first word here.

Speaking at the conference, V. Akpambetov, chief of an independent STK, stated: "It is easy to work with raykom chairman Kibkalov, but the committee and its apparatus need to be encouraged." Thus, he expressed in his way the opinion of DOSAAF members about the urgent need for a fundamental improvement in the working style of the guiding organs of the rayon defense organization.

Fleet Adm G. Yegorov, USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Chairman, spoke at the conference and answered questions of the delegates.

CPSU Central Committee official P. Belomestnov took part in the work of the conference.

9069

Dispute Between Unit Commander, Party Secretary Described

*18010202b Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 23,
Dec 87 pp 43-48*

[Article by Maj Yu. Tretyakov: "Against the Interests of the Job (Why Did a Conflict Between a Military Construction Detachment Commander and Party Organization Secretary Drag Out?)"]

[Text] Six years ago, when Lt Col N. Bulgakov was assigned as commander of a military construction detachment, this unit chronically lagged behind in fulfillment of its production targets. There were many

reasons: the low level of military discipline, formalism in party political work, and the poorly organized living conditions of the personnel. All of these things were tangled into a tight knot, which turned out to be very difficult to untie. Approximately two years of intense work by the command and party organization were required in order for the detachment to begin gradually to extricate itself and, for the first time in a long time, fulfill its socialist commitments. Two years later the unit was awarded the honorary title of a communist labor collective, and the competitive Red Banner of a victor in socialist competition. Now the detachment fulfills its production targets every month by 120-130 percent; and gross violations of military discipline have declined.

It would seem that a good run has been made and promising prospects noted. With the experience acquired by the command and party organization, the personnel of the military construction detachment are entirely capable of handling the new problems born of the times and tasks of restructuring.

However, here are lines from a letter by Sr Lt I. Moiseyev. "We have repeatedly," the officer wrote to the editors, "called things by their names at party meetings, in order to go further and restructure ourselves in deed. But, every time the mechanism of "letting off steam" went to work. The appearance of solving problems was created and small concessions were made, but everything remained as before. Therefore, all of us are greatly alarmed that this mechanism is difficult to catch, although we understand that it is necessary to destroy it, while people have not lost faith for once and for all in truth and justice...."

The letter's author is secretary of the unit party buro. What is going on in the detachment, which for a long time has already been numbered among the leaders?

Several months after his selection as party organization secretary, Sr Lt Moiseyev stated at a meeting that the communist labor detachment was still not completely affirming this high title. It is true that at the time his speech contained neither important facts, nor a thorough assessment of the situation in the collective. As Moiseyev later recognized, he lacked the boldness to state the blunders of the communist leaders, and then could not yet precisely formulate his own thoughts.

The next meeting came, at which the secretary again returned to the same issue. He stated that gross violations of military discipline were continuing in the unit, that many officers and warrant officers had lost interest in their duty, and that the detachment command rarely listened to people's opinions and was not always attentive toward their needs and requests.

To judge from the secretary's talk, the reason for all these shortcomings focused on the personality of Communist Bulgakov. We will say straight out that this assessment is

not entirely objective. Nevertheless, the secretary's position found both enemies and adherents among the communists. Why was the reaction of the party members ambiguous?

Everyone with whom I spoke said unanimously that the step forward the unit made in recent years was primary to the credit of Lt Col Bulgakov. They noted his organizational qualities and qualities of will, and his ability to involve himself in all the details and ensure that each order was fulfilled precisely and on time. At the same time, Capt V. Tyurin, Sr Lt N. Simukhov, and several other company grade officers complained that his strict control over their actions had long already turned into trivial tutelage and distrust. The company commanders themselves were not even authorized to decide the question of granting leave to the men. Naturally, the soldiers and sergeants saw this. And frequently they appealed on personal questions to the headquarters over the heads of their direct supervisors, knowing that they would probably not be able to make an independent decision. Nor could the company commanders even grant subordinate officers and warrant officers their established day off. If I let a platoon commander off, stated Sr Lt V. Masnyy, that means that I think over how to "cover" his sector, and personally bear responsibility for it. But I am not allowed to do this.

Such distrust hurts and engenders lack of confidence in one's abilities. In the end it dampens people's enthusiasm. Lt Col Bulgakov even distributes the soldiers and sergeants himself daily to the work sites. In our conversation he stated that to entrust this to the company commanders would lead to some kind of unpleasanties. And he cited a recent incident when an error by Capt V. Podyapolskiy led to serious consequences.

What is there to say? There really was an error. But, on the other hand, how can an officer acquire necessary experience in organizational skills if he is deprived of independence, and most often forced to act as he is prompted? Here one cannot help but begin to make mistakes, discussions about which, by the way, often occur in raised voices.

Many in the unit stated that Lt Col Bulgakov's demandingness frequently bordered on crudeness, and his remarks took a form that not only affected self-esteem, but also insulted the personal worth of his subordinates. Repeatedly he brought a soldier or sergeant in front of the formation and gave him a crude dressing-down. There were instances, and rather often, when even officers received "pep talks."

Lt Col Bulgakov himself, under pressure of the facts, acknowledged that at times he was hot-tempered and sharp. But he considered it necessary to clarify that he punished always for a misdeed. Yes, the officer cannot be reproached for not being objective. But, is it necessary to prove that coarseness and lack of self-control on the part of a communist leader works against his authority,

creates a nervous situation in the collective, and affects the frame of mind of his subordinates? These are obvious truths. Although far from everyone in the unit agreed with them. Maj A. Klyuchnikov, detachment chief of staff, once stated in front of other people: If he did not swear at you all, you would run away from work all together, so Communist Bulgakov is right.

He is right, of course, in opposing laxity with demandingness, and carelessness with strictness. But, we cannot remove from the calculations the fact that the arbitrary methods of leadership, distrust toward people, and harshness in his relationships with them lead his subordinates away from a state of equilibrium, and have far from the best effect on the moral climate of the collective. Here is one small, but very characteristic detail. Capt V. Tyurin submitted a request to Lt Col Bulgakov to be granted regular leave. The answer came; come in another week. But the second and third times the officer also received a brief denial, despite the fact that he had requested leave according to schedule, and, moreover, exceptional circumstances had occurred in his family. "It is not possible to allow you to go," Capt Tyurin invariably heard in response to his request. But, such an opportunity appeared in literally a few days, as soon as Lt Col Bulgakov himself went on leave. Indisputably, the commander alone decides on leave for his subordinates, as well as on many other questions concerning service. But, was it really difficult to explain without reticence, stated Tyurin, why my presence in the company at that moment was necessary?

One is left with an unpleasant aftertaste in his heart, and another... Warrant Officer A. Vlasov, company deputy for political affairs, for example, expressed himself still more definitively: "I avoid going to Lt Col N. Bulgakov on personal matters, because I do not count on reaching mutual understanding."

Restructuring then will go more successfully when its tone is set by the leaders. It can be moved forward only by renouncing truly bureaucratic methods, and by relying on people's experience and initiative. These instructions run through all the party documents. But, it is as though Lt Col Bulgakov has his own view on these problems. He who worked before does not need to be restructured, he stated in his speech at one of the party meetings.

Sr Lt N. Moiseyev expressed his disagreement with this position repeatedly. And one could take his side entirely and completely if the officer's principles had not turned out to be compromised. How, logically, must a secretary act if he saw that a communist leader's methods of working with people did not meet present requirements in all respects? Obviously, he must openly pose the question to the buro, of which Lt Col Bulgakov is a member, and personally speak with him. But Sr Lt Moiseyev did not do this, out of fear, as he himself acknowledged, that they would not understand him. Instead of this, he began to assess the actions of his

commander virtually behind his back, to seek out omissions in his work, overall shortcomings in the unit, and to place maximum responsibility for them on Bulgakov alone. Yes, and he spoke at the meeting, criticizing the communist leader, in his absence.

All of this, of course, became known to Lt Col Bulgakov. And it in no way facilitated mutual understanding between the two party bureau members. The commander's already guarded attitude toward Moiseyev was replaced by open hostility. His pride interfered with the ability of Nikolay Grigoryevich to understand the situation thoroughly and weigh carefully in what the secretary was right and in what he was clearly overshooting the mark. He expressed bewilderment during our conversation at why I first had to make contact in the unit. His statements about the business-like qualities of the secretary were unequivocal: There are people in the detachment who still lack experience, but only Moiseyev is unscrupulous.

Is this not too categorical an assertion? A year has not yet passed since Sr Lt Moiseyev was assigned to the position of unit propagandist. Almost simultaneously he was also elected party organization secretary. It is entirely understandable that many errors in his work are explained by his lack of experience, and inability so far without harm to the work to combine his official and party duties. Although far from everything can be explained by citing his youth. The communists stated that the secretary was rarely present during production, and did not carry out individual work with people actively enough. There are also serious shortcomings in the organization of intra-party work to which officers from the political department, who had worked for several days in the detachment, brought to the attention of Sr Lt Moiseyev. In particular, the school of young communists is virtually inactive; work with CPSU members and candidate members who have penalties is being poorly carried out; and documentation is not being formulated in a timely manner. The list could be continued. But, I believe that we are concerned here not with the number of shortcomings, but with the attitude of the communists toward them. Lt Col N. Bulgakov, as a bureau member, and member of the political department party commission, also received a reproof from the political organ workers for omissions in the organization of party work in the unit. Then the party aktiv was to gather together, each was to reassess his position, and they were jointly to set about to eliminate the shortcomings. But this did not occur. Lt Col Bulgakov blamed the secretary for inactivity and slackness, and Sr Lt Moiseyev justified himself by saying that no one was helping him. Personal ambitions again gained the upper hand.

The conflict clearly ended up in a blind alley. Maj Ye. Kalyuzhnyy, deputy detachment commander for political affairs, could have suggested a way out, had he displayed sufficient principles. But, unfortunately, the political worker was not yet able to rise up to assess the commander as an educator. He also sidestepped in our

conversation the position taken by the party bureau secretary. Why was Moiseyev so extreme in his judgments, and why did he, exacerbating an otherwise already protracted conflict, not want to seek paths to mutual understanding? The deputy for political affairs could give only one answer to these questions: "I do not know; I cannot say precisely." As concerns the shortcomings uncovered by the group of officers from the political department in the work of the unit party organization, the political officer acknowledged frankly: "The untimely formulation of reports is my personal oversight."

Here it is difficult to agree. The reports are the oversight of solely Moiseyev himself. But for omissions in the organizational work of the party bureau, shortcomings in the education of young communists, and poor control over the fulfillment of party decisions, the deputy for political affairs and the secretary bear equal responsibility. However, Maj Ye. Kalyuzhnyy also did not plan to divide this in half. Soon after the inspection he wrote a statement to the party organization which, having enumerated all the shortcomings uncovered by the political department workers, requested that the party organization secretary be brought to party accountability for his serious personal oversights in work with documentation and weak knowledge of guidance documents. Several days later a party bureau session was held, where Maj Kalyuzhnyy's proposal to officially reprimand Sr Lt Moiseyev received two votes "for" and one "against." This was done, it is relevant to state, in violation of party norms. For his personnel file was not brought, and in their haste the activists forgot to conduct a party investigation. It was necessary to meet again. The former decision remained in force. But the party meeting did not affirm it, limiting itself to pointing out to the secretary his shortcomings in organizational work. As we see, instead of giving an inexperienced, busy party bureau secretary assistance in correcting matters, the political officer took the easiest path.

Maj Kalyuzhnyy's approach to evaluating Sr Lt Moiseyev as a propagandist is also not entirely understandable. Yes, he has omissions associated with personal disorganization, and shortcomings caused by a lack of experience. They were enumerated in detail in the talk the deputy for political affairs held with Moiseyev about holding off on awarding him his next military rank. Although it is difficult to derive anything useful and able to assist in his subsequent work from this document. Maj Kalyuzhnyy simply rewrote in it all the duties of a propagandist, and added at each point the words "does not fulfill" or "does not completely fulfill." Apropos of this, somehow duties that lie fully on the shoulders of the deputy commander for political affairs also got on this lengthy list. But these are already details. The main point is that such a formalistic approach to assessing his work did not arouse anything in Sr Lt Moiseyev except wounded feelings.

How and when was the struggle for the interests of the cause replaced by a struggle of pride in the communist

leaders? It is now already difficult to answer this question definitively. There have been too many layers of mutual injury, and prejudice toward one another has become too firmly embedded in the consciousness of each. But here is what pricks up one's ears. Despite all of his irascibility and bluntness, and extremes in his assessments, Sr Lt Moiseyev truly understood the questions that required immediate resolution. However, the unit command "did not notice" this, having concentrated all its attention on the personality of the secretary and his blunders. The sensitivity toward criticism prevented them from seeing the problems that had arisen in the collective. Although Moiseyev did not state only his own point of view. At this same meeting the communists largely supported him. They spoke about a lack of sensitivity and attention toward people, crudity by senior officers, distrust of company-level officers, and disrespect for their opinions. Capt Podyapolskiy, for example, made a rather sharp general statement that those who criticize at the meetings often fall into unkindness, and those who keep silent enjoy the support of the command.

Is this not a reason for a serious, party-like principled discussion, and for thorough analysis of the situation that had taken shape in the party organization? However, so far there has been no reaction to the critical remarks and suggestions made by the communists. Lt Col Bulgakov, citing his own absence, acknowledged that he had a rather hazy impression about what went on at the meeting. That is a pity. Why not talk with the secretary and the other communists, and elucidate their frames of mind and opinions? After all, the people really were talking about the urgent matters and requirements of restructuring. In turn, Sr Lt Moiseyev also did not demonstrate initiative, and expected that the commander himself would invite him in for a talk. Again ambitions and mutual dislike got the upper hand over the interests of the cause. It is precisely for this reason that the work of the unit party organization in several directions is still running idle.

Let us say, at one of the buro sessions the contribution of the communists in the company commanded by Capt A. Ivanov, in inculcating in the personnel self-discipline and responsiveness was analyzed. Maj Klyuchnikov, the speaker, gave an unflattering assessment of the work of the party organization. He noted, in particular, that the officer-communists exerted weak control over the daily duty detail, at times were inattentive to the needs and requests of the military construction workers, and virtually did not conduct preventive measures against violations of regulatory requirements. The education of junior commanders is also a weak point. Many sergeants are poorly prepared professionally, are not trained to be independent, and are unable to establish control over their subordinates. And the officers and warrant officers, instead of teaching the junior commanders, replace them. This has even been discussed repeatedly at party meetings.

Seemingly a thorough analysis was made, mistakes were brought to light, and it is necessary to take specific measures. But the party buro decision was a standard collection of the usual phrases: assist the company commander and party organization; increase attention to individual work with violators of military discipline. And it said not a word about who and what precisely, and by when the action was to be accomplished.

Incidentally, Moiseyev himself does not hide the fact that he neglected intra-party work. He explains this all in the same way: distrust toward him by the command and lack of assistance. However, he could give no answer to the question about what problems he personally presented to Lt Col Bulgakov or Maj Klyuchnikov, and in what precisely he did not receive support.

Does the political department know about the atmosphere that has taken shape in the detachment party organization? Yes, they know. Both Lt Col Bulgakov and Sr Lt Moiseyev informed it about the existing disagreements between the political organ workers. However, judging by the words of Col A. Chernyayev, chief of the political department (today transferred to a new place of service), they did not cause particular concern. Yes, some things were neglected in the plane of personal contacts between the commander and secretary, he stated during our meeting, and now they are based on mutual distrust. But I do not see any conflicts. Of course, Moiseyev did carry some things to extremes, and also attempted to place some of the blame for his blunders in organizational work on the shoulders of others, but it is valuable that the young secretary does not pass by his shortcomings. We will correct him and teach him, stated the political department chief. And, he emphasized, he had also held repeated discussions with Lt Col Bulgakov. In particular, he indicated the need for him to rely more on the party organization and guide the work of the secretary more tactfully.

All this is so. Both the political department chief and other workers visited the unit repeatedly. But their visits mainly amounted to checking the state of intra-party work, and to monitoring the conduct of various measures. At least no tangible changes took place in the relationship between the communist leaders. Is this not because the political department workers did not see or did not wish to see the essence of the conflict? Moiseyev's personal mistakes overshadowed everything. And the fact that the questions he raised indicate clear trouble in a leading unit remained in the shadows. The young secretary received no support in his desire to solve the problems that had accumulated. Meanwhile, the conflict continues. And it takes place before the eyes of the entire party collective. Some of the communists largely support the secretary, and others consider that he should not have washed the dirty linen in public. Some are waiting to see how this clearly protracted bickering will end. So who, other than the political department, is to dot all the

"i's"? Why not gather the communists together, speak openly, and thereby put an end to the rampant gossip that, alas, is going on in the hallways?

Glasnost and an open exchange of opinions are being asserted in the life of the party organizations so that, with their help, all the troublesome problems can be solved collectively. On this path disputes, and clashes of views and positions, are unavoidable. And it is very important that they lead to truth, and not turn into a battle of pride. It is very important that the actions of the communists be determined by the interests of the cause, and not go counter to them.

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Role of Political Workers in Improving Flight Safety

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[Article by Col Gen Avn L. Batekhin, military soviet member, chief, VVS Political Directorate: "A Time for Seeking and For Increased Responsibility"]

[Text] Every day that brings us closer to the 19th All-Union Party Conference, restructuring of party work is gaining speed in many VVS [Air Force] collectives. In the practical activity of party organizations the turn toward vital work, and the specific individual is noticeable. As a result, its main force in aviation—pilots, navigators and ground specialists—are being actively included in restructuring. Stress is being placed more and more insistently on implementing the instructions of the 27th Party Congress, and the subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums, on building up organizational and political efforts of party organs in priority directions.

Flight safety is a special concern today. This is a multifaceted problem, and its successful resolution depends largely on purposeful activity by the military soviet, Main Headquarters, political directorate and administrative party organizations. This can be said to be the whetstone on which the skill of the party leadership is most keenly sharpened by on-going processes. It is another matter that we are not always able to exploit them ably, or persistently teach party organs and party organizations this ability. And unskillful solving of the tasks of party-political support of accident-free flying inevitably affects its quality. Serious violations of the laws of flying duty were committed, for example, this training year in a number of military collectives, for which some communist leaders were subjected to sharp criticism at a meeting of chiefs of VVS political organs. At the same time, it seems that the party organizations of

regiments and squadrons, which are directly in the zone of the struggle for accident-free flying, should have a lot to say here. What can be said on this account?

In many units and subunits party organizations pay paramount attention to flying methodological work, commander's training, the condition of airfield facilities and the aircraft park, use of the training base, and the level of military-technical propaganda. In their field of vision are pilots, engineers and technicians who have low theoretical knowledge and weak practical skills. Even the slightest deviation from flying laws receives sharp party assessments, and the attendant causes are thoroughly examined. In short, everything necessary is done to ensure that the breakdown or defects in equipment, or incorrect actions on the part of the personnel in operating it are not repeated.

At the same time one cannot help but see that an understanding of the need for modernization and numerous repetitions of correct words about restructuring are still far from everywhere and far from always leading to an effective search for new forms and methods of party work. Frequently communist leaders, political organs and party organizations, understanding the importance of restructuring, attempt to solve the new tasks by old methods, and in some places only discussions go on, but little is being done in order to decide firmly who, how and what precisely must restructure. And if there is no clear plan, there will also be no tangible results, there will remain only discussions and appeals, as occurred repeatedly in the past. Unfortunately, habit and inertia are alive in party practice, and they pull us backwards, and do not allow many to turn away from the past and the accustomed, and take on full responsibility for the organization of restructuring and for bringing plans to completion.

We cannot reconcile ourselves further to these shortcomings. Today principles and strictness are needed in assessments of the very system for preventing the prerequisites for flying accidents. Most of all, the effectiveness of party political work in the main areas of flight safety should be assessed more self-critically, and important lessons should be drawn from the past. What are these areas? Let us discuss some of them.

Flying is an extremely complex activity of heightened risk. There must be a special level of responsibility for strict and punctual observance of laws, procedure and rules of flight duty. That is why it is so important that the primary party organization become the decisive force for mastering the new and higher level of work with flight personnel on accident prevention. The squadron and regiment party organization is responsible for the reliability of the human factor, not in general, but in its specific expression. For aviation this is always important. Being a pilot is an individual profession. As a rule, he is alone in the cockpit. The world of his experiences cannot be repeated. Each flight is individual. The reasons for flying accidents are individual. And work with

the pilots must also be individual. It is not enough to prepare him methodologically for a given flying task; he must be morally and physically attuned to each flight. The party organization is called upon to be the generator of this process. The leading VVS party collectives are such.

In this regard, the experience of majors V. Kutepov and V. Shevchuk is instructive. Both are party activists—energetic, creative and demanding people, constantly enriching those around them and inculcating in themselves new thoughts and ideas. They have in common heightened attention toward each specific communist—pilot, engineer, technician. Their co-workers share with them their dreams and sore points, knowing full well that they will listen attentively and help. Simultaneously, in the party organizations led by officers V. Kutepov and V. Shevchuk, the CPSU members have begun much more frequently than before to report on their personal contribution to improving air and ground training. Special demands in this regard are made on those members of elected party organs who are responsible for ensuring that communists are examples in the struggle for high class qualification, and technical and specialist training, and for sharing leading experience, improving the training base and developing socialist competition. In some regiments party committees have achieved a principled assessment of the party qualities of the communists. Here observance of flying laws is also much better than in other collectives, which also indicates the high efficiency of the work of party organizations with communists, on their training and education.

In connection with this we cannot help but touch the problem of popularizing and introducing leading flying tactical experience. It is senseless to view flight safety in isolation from the kernels of that which is new and positive that the good new seedlings have already given. This is understood well in the party committee where Lt Col B. Vorobyev is a member. The party activists rendered specific assistance to the regiment command in mastering the combat capabilities of a new generation fighter. The party committee actively helped, in particular, establish a unique laboratory of flying methodological and tactical training of the aviators. Here much is being done on the advanced modeling of various aerial combat situations and on researching the opportunities for the most complete use of the formula "tactics—from takeoff to landing." And there are numerous such examples.

However, the kernels of advanced techniques for maintaining rhythmic and accident-free flying are still frequently isolated. At times there is no one to gather them together. And this is a direct duty of the political organs and party organizations. Meanwhile, the political departments where officers V. Osadchiy and S. Kravchenko work have forgotten such forms of educating people from leading experience as rallies and meetings of excellent flight personnel, and honoring the best masters of combat employment. In a number of places the spirit of

red-tape is blowing from the test-benches of the victors in socialist competition. Other forms of moral incentives are not being perfected. The results of military training are being summed up without spirit and good imagination.

We all understand that the best masters of their work in aviation have always been and shall be in view. Our units and large units have their Chkalovs, Gromovs and Kamanins. And of course, the political departments, party committees and party buros must spend a significant part of their working time generalizing, introducing and disseminating leading experience. The most widespread agenda of the party committee session should be examination of measures for the development of specific initiatives, the support of innovators, and the condemnation of the adherents of stagnation. The times in which we live insistently dictate this. Maturity of party leadership in its modern understanding does not consist of waiting until the sprouts of that which is new and advanced grow all by themselves, but of helping them grow stronger, and accelerating the maturation process.

If this does not happen, then everything in my view boils down to one main thing. The political organs pay insufficient attention to training and educating squadron political officers and party activists, the direct organizers of party political work in the local areas. And if it is considered that there is no school for training deputy squadron commanders for political affairs, and that they must obtain knowledge and experience while already with the forces, it becomes clear how important this is.

Today the ability to operate in the spirit of truth is of fundamental importance. Without understanding and recognizing shortcomings, omissions and distortions, we cannot move forward. And much must be subjected to harsh analysis. In the past, frequently words were not matched by deeds. Indifference and complacency were widespread. The demonstration aspect moved to the forefront in military training, and its main essence—teaching that which is necessary in real combat, and teaching true flying skill—began to be put on the back burner. This, of course, could not help but affect the quality of flying work. One of the reasons for this, we are convinced, is the fact that party organizations paid insufficient attention to ideological support of the military training of aviators and of flight safety.

I will cite this fact. Despite serious shortcomings in flying and technological discipline, despite the existence of dangerous prerequisites for flying accidents through the fault of military personnel, many of them, as the inspection showed, received good and excellent marks in political training. Thus it is not taking into account that the main criterion of assessing the level of political knowledge should be not words, and I would say, not even knowledge, but convictions embodied in specific practical results. An officer cannot have an excellent or good assessment who, despite presenting a detailed speech at a seminar, displays laxity in maintaining

equipment, and prepares poorly for flights. In accordance with this, it is necessary for political organs, party committees and party buros to turn around existing practice. This will also force people to think more about deeds, and not about their verbal form. It is precisely active, specific actions that some communists at times lack, including those occupying high positions.

I believe there is a need to pay attention to this aspect of the problem. The sources of the qualities needed in the future aviator are found in the military educational institutions where the youths for the first time come into full contact with their future profession. Here it is important that from the very first steps the training process be inseparably linked with the educational process, so that, along with developing piloting techniques, studying equipment and gaining understanding of the laws of aerodynamics, such qualities as moral-political and psychological staunchness, self-discipline, and high responsibility for the strict observance of the rules regulating flying are also inculcated in the future aerial warriors. And who, if not the VUZ party organizations, which should have the future pilots most of all at the center of their attention, is concerned about this? Only far from all of them have turned to face this problem. Speechifying, on-paper creativity, and all kinds of measures calculated "to draw in" but behind which no specific individual is apparent are still found. To proceed from the goal, from life, is the essence of organizational and ideological work of party organizations in ensuring flight safety.

The same approach is also required today in all the inner life of party organizations. It is important to take strictly into account that the criterion for assessing the position and contribution of each communist, party group and party organization in the restructuring of flying work can today only be their attitude toward acceleration, glasnost, criticism and self-criticism, the process of democratization, and actual participation in the modernization of all flying matters. It is necessary to recognize that far from all our party organizations are of this sort. Let's face it, in units and large unit headquarters there are still many communists, and even party committee and buro members, who, figuratively speaking, fulfill the role of a weather-vane, and not that of a compass for all the personnel. Meanwhile, the party sees the implementation of its plans associated with restructuring primarily in enhancing the responsibility of party organizations. A fundamental improvement in the activity of party organizations, party organs and cadres is becoming the main task of today, it was noted at a ceremonial session in the Kremlin devoted to the 70th anniversary of Great October. It is necessary to achieve a turning point in the activity of each party organization, and to increase the activeness of the work of each party committee and every communist.

What must be done to achieve this? Life today tells us quite insistently that, in the interests of struggling for flight safety, and thus in the interests of struggling for

combat readiness, it is necessary to increase the responsibility of military cadres for the work entrusted to them, and everywhere to create a situation of mutual demandingness and strict accountability for one's actions and deeds, and decisively stop manifestations of laxity and disorganization. True concern about cadres has nothing in common with indifference and an all-forgiving attitude, charitability and playing games. He who cannot change the situation for the better in the area entrusted to him does not have the right to occupy a leadership position. One must not gaze indifferently at an untalented person who is incapable of more, as he ruins things, and at times demoralizes the collective with his actions and conduct.

The ability of a communist leader to analyze his actions, openly acknowledge errors and effectively eliminate them is an indicator of his political maturity and party-mindedness. And here it is very important that the primary party organizations fully use their authority. No matter what position a party member occupies, he is responsible for his actions first of all to the party organization. This regulatory requirement is a necessary condition for correct education of cadres and strengthening of party discipline.

Only not all political organs and party organizations of large units and units have yet taken a principled position in assessing the work of CPSU members, and especially in assessing the activity of communist leaders. I focus attention on this because everything, as is known, begins with the commander. There are instances in which prerequisites for flying accidents have been covered up, flight data have been distorted and weather information falsified, for the purpose of making a fictitious confirmation of class qualification. Characteristically, more than 50 percent of the prerequisites for flying accidents occurred through the fault of the leadership. At the same time, communist leaders often remain outside the zone of party criticism. Frequently this happens because they allotted to themselves the role of some sort of final arbiter. Thus, it is not enough that Col V. Konstinevich has serious deficiencies in his work with people, he even became indignant when his party reference was discussed at a party meeting in the primary organization. This is obvious lack of understanding of the processes of democratization, which are persistently making their way in the army environment.

Currently substantial changes are taking place in this matter. Criticism and self-criticism are becoming norms of the life and activity of communists. Whereas, until recently shortcomings in ensuring accident-free flying were discussed mainly with the commander and political officer, and the party organization secretary remained on the sidelines, now there is another approach. The squadron, battalion or headquarters party organization secretary also examines each mistake, each case of a violation in flying techniques, or in preparing the aircraft (helicopter) for flight. And the regiment party committee secretary examines every prerequisite for a flight accident.

The time has come, no doubt, also to evaluate the party organization as a whole, especially as regards how successfully it influences the work and conduct of each communist, especially during flights, on days of prior preparation for them, in studying new aviation equipment and weapons, in preventing over-simplification and indulgences in flying and ground preparation, and on its attitude toward various types of innovations and rationalizer's work.

However, it is still too early to talk about important advances. There is still no end of work to be done. Political organs and party organizations also have to restructure the attitudes of some communist leaders toward the struggle for the state of both personal self-discipline, and discipline of subordinates. First of all, there must be no undisciplined communists; this is the crux of all work to ensure their leading role. So far party accountability for violations is not being ensured in some large units and units. It is most difficult to raise the demandingness of party organizations in evaluating the contributions of communists of administrative and headquarters party organizations. This can be clearly traced from the example of a large unit headquarters party organization, where Lt Col N. Klinichev is party buro secretary. Over an 18 month period a number of most serious violations of flight rules, both on the ground and in the air, were committed in the units of the division. But not a single communist from headquarters bore party responsibility for this. Here the work of the VVS political directorate was undoubtedly also inadequate. A principled attitude on the part of the headquarters party organization for the affairs of CPSU members was not achieved, and the work there was virtually allowed to take its own course.

We are talking about involving all the authority and force of the party organizations to dismantle decisively a psychologically harmful rule, when persons are made to answer for negligence and violations of flight rules only when they have already led to an accident, a dangerous prerequisite or breakage. Until an environment of strict demands for each violation becomes a reality, no turning point in ensuring flight safety will be achieved. In this is found a kind of psychological directive for each political department and every primary party organization.

The development of aviation equipment is making fundamental changes in the nature of the activity of pilots, and is significantly increasing their mental, physical and psychological burdens. Piloting a modern flying apparatus requires a higher tempo of activity on the part of the pilot. In the last three decades the number of instruments in the cockpit has increased several times over, and the time to accomplish each operation of controlling the engine and equipment has substantially declined, due to the increased flight speed and changes in the operating conditions of the equipment. Any imprecision in calculations or delay in decision making leads to serious errors, which sometimes end in flying accidents and dangerous prerequisites for them.

That is why questions of organizing a permanent system of moral and psychological training of pilots, and soldier-aviators of other specialties, in the regiment are becoming extremely acute. Unfortunately, this most important component of personnel training is underestimated in the work of commanders, political officers and party organizations. Moreover, in flying training in both the schools and the regiments, modern achievements and recommendations by air and space medicine and military psychology, for developing in pilots psychological staunchness and reliability for working under extreme conditions, are still slow to be introduced. The sections devoted to moral and psychological training in methodological soviets function without initiative and formalistically, and special classes and psychological unburdening rooms are not created everywhere. Commanders, political officers and aviation physicians do not display the necessary initiative and interest in introducing elements of autogenous training exercises in flight training, the undoubted value of which has long been proven.

I believe it is necessary to take steps without delay. In first priority commanders, political organs and party organizations, who bear direct responsibility for this most important area—the moral-political and psychological training of the personnel—must face this problem. Only the pilot's highly developed qualities of will are able to remove fatal feelings of bewilderment, lack of confidence, and all kinds of enfeebling misgivings, conquer the shiver of fear hidden away somewhere deep in the heart, and help him mobilize himself to successfully complete the flying mission.

And here is something else. Today much is being said about the role of the human factor. And this is correct. Life itself has convincingly proved that only by placing man at the center of party work can the tasks facing pilots be successfully solved. The main meaning of the fundamental restructuring of party work even consists of turning to people and to vital matters. It is most of all necessary to pay the most serious attention to the living conditions of flight and engineer-technical personnel, and to the organization of rest. Due to the specifics of their service, which is associated with tremendous nervous and physical tension, aerial warriors have their own special regimen, which differs from the regimen of those who serve on the ground. An aviator who sleeps poorly before a flight is already in and of himself an emergency. It is not enough that in flight he will lack strength of purpose, and thus precision of action. Little by little irritation and dissatisfaction with himself and his life will grow in him. And from this he is already close to emotional collapse, breakdown and violation of regulatory discipline.

I would like to say a good word about Sr Lt A. Konosov, party organization secretary of a detachment in one of the military transport aviation regiments. As an assistant aircraft commander (and this is in itself a considerable burden), he conducts party policy, mainly "locking" it

on a specific member of the crew. When a crucial long-haul route is coming Konosov asks the aircraft commander how the personnel rested before the flight, gives individual tasks to the party group organizer and agitator, elucidates who requires family assistance, makes arrangements for kindergarten, and greets relatives coming to visit. He has developed good, business-like contacts with the detachment commander, Maj V. Davydov. Therefore, it is entirely natural that there is a healthy moral climate, a business-like frame of mind and high results in service in the collective, and that there are no disciplinary infractions.

Nevertheless, today there are still numerous shortcomings in this area. Today it has become a rarity for a unit political officer or party committee secretary to drop in on the family of a pilot "for a chat," to talk about everyday things, and help with advice and deeds. Somehow this is not agreeable. Behind the equipment we have stopped seeing the man with his concerns and needs.

Matters are worse yet with the organization of leisure time. What do the officers' home and officers' clubs offer today, so to speak, for the spirit? Films, many of which have already been seen and seen again, lectures and amateur artistic performances on major holidays. Equipment is changing and becoming more complex, and the intellectual level of those who control it is growing. Only the forms of work of cultural centers remain on the past level. Naturally, they do not satisfy people and we see some officers seek diversion elsewhere, and frequently they are pulled toward drinking. And here, seemingly unnoticed, an overall good pilot, or a knowledgeable

aviation specialist becomes a violator of military discipline, to whom then, quite understandably, they fear to entrust an aircraft. And commanders and party activists seemingly cannot understand and are surprised at what happened to the man.

We must acknowledge that many communist leaders are not working hard enough here. This includes workers in the political directorate. Inertia, bureaucracy and fear of initiative from below (no matter what happens), and a lack of desire to listen to the frank statements of subordinates, and to encourage them in this regard, make themselves known. But communists in local areas must not sit with their arms folded and wait for someone to come and do for them. Restructuring is the business of all of us and each one of us. No one shall stand aside from it.

These are just some of the problems that, it seems to me, today require the closest attention. As a matter of fact there are significantly more. Ensuring flying safety is a complex and multi-faceted task. It can be solved if we approach it in a more all-round manner, and if the political organs and party organizations will take part most ardently along with commanders in this important matter. This is possible only under the conditions of restructuring their activity, and modernizing the forms and methods of their work. Now is the time also to seek increased responsibility. It is a time for responsibility to the party and the Soviet people, who entrusted to us soldiers defense of their peaceful, creative labor, and defense of the socialist fatherland.

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Conventional Weapons of Destruction

18010091 Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in
Russian No 12, Dec 87 p 32

[Unattributed 500-word article entitled: "Conventional Weapons of Destruction".

[Text] In modern conditions, together with the development of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weaponry, so-called conventional weaponry, which include high-explosive fragmentation, incendiary weaponry and fuel-air explosives, continue to be improved. Fragmentation shells are in widespread use in local wars in Lebanon, Afghanistan and other regions. Their special characteristic is a great quantity of fragments (from hundreds to several thousands) such as ball-bearings, needles, and shot.

Special cassettes, containing from 96 to 640 cluster bombs [sharikovykh bomb], are dropped from planes. Due to the action of a bursting charge the cassette is exploded in the air and the bombs, flying outward, are exploded over an area of 160-250 square meters. They are equipped with timed, pressure, pull-action and delayed-action fuzes. Such warheads can inflict serious injury upon people.

Dugouts, shelters, stone and steel-reinforced concrete buildings, and other engineering structures can be used as reliable protection from fragmentation shells and cluster bombs [sharikovykh bomb].

High-explosive shells were broadly used during the years of the second world war for the destruction of buildings, structures, communications systems, and industrial and transport facilities. For example, the cement-piercing "Dyurandal" was designed to destroy airfield runways and other facilities with a cement thickness of up to 70 cm. The caliber of high-explosive bombs is from 50 kg up to 10 thousand kg. Aircraft are the primary means of delivery.

The so-called vacuum bomb or fuel-air explosive is, unfortunately, well known. This barbarous American-produced weapon was widely used by the Israelis in Lebanon. Such weapons are intended to destroy people, structures, and equipment by shock wave and fire. A special gas-air mixture is used in them. The principle of operation is based on the fact that when an explosion occurs an aerosol cloud, which ignites in several places, is formed, and in the end an explosion of great power, comparable in effect to the shock wave from the explosion of a small caliber nuclear warhead, is produced.

It is necessary to state again that all modern shelters, many anti-radiation shelters, and also slit trenches with an earthen face and overhead cover may serve as effective protection.

Over the ages fire has been used to destroy enemy personnel and materiel. Thus, the USA carried out the first air raid using napalm on Japan in March of 1945, resulting in the generation of a fire storm in Tokyo. The Pentagon leadership later determined that even a nuclear bomb could not be compared to incendiary weapons, neither in terms of the number of injured, nor in terms of the number of buildings, installations, or property that were destroyed.

The greatest destruction is caused by napalm, the basis of which is gasoline and a powdered thickening agent. It burns well and adheres even to damp surfaces. It is capable of achieving a high temperature (1000-1200°C) with an extended duration of combustion of 5-10 minutes, and is lighter than water and therefore floats on its surface. Even a gram falling on the skin of an individual can cause a serious wound.

The metallic incendiary mixture "Elektron"—a combination of magnesium, aluminum and other elements—ignites at around 600°C and burns with a blinding white or blue flame, reaching a temperature of 2800°C.

Thermite compounds—a compressed powder of aluminum and high-heat metal oxides—are being used. Burning thermite heats to 3000°C. At this temperature cement and brick crack, and iron and steel burn.

White phosphorus is capable of spontaneous combustion when combined with oxygen in the atmosphere. It is used primarily as the igniter for napalm.

Not only the high temperature, but also the smoke and the concentration of carbon monoxide and other byproducts of the combustion present danger to humans. When the burning mixture falls on individual protective equipment and clothing, they are discarded. If this is impossible, a wrap, jacket, or sacking is thrown over the individual and he is pressed to the ground or submerged in water, without the clothing being removed. The area touched by the compound can be covered by the sleeve or other part of a garment, or with sod or dirt. One should not run, since this feeds the fire and leads to serious injury.

When an enemy employs incendiary weapons, it is best to take cover in a shelter or antiradiation or other underground facility. In open places it is possible to use ravines, gutters, ditches, and hollows.

The effectiveness of protection from conventional weapons of mass destruction depends, in large measure, on the steadfastness of people and their knowledge of how to conduct themselves correctly under attack, to use defensive facilities, and to fight fire.

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UD/335

Yazov Writes on Pact Military Doctrine

52001048 Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 10, Oct 87 pp 3-8

[Article by USSR Minister of Defense Army General Dmitriy Yazov: "Warsaw Treaty Military Doctrine—For Defence of Peace and Socialism"]

[Text] The document The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Member States was adopted at the conference of the Political Consultative Committee held in Berlin on 28-29 May this year. Highly assessing the document, the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee stated that it expresses precisely the defensive nature of the military strategy of socialism and promotes the development of dialogue between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO and confidence building in Europe.

The document's principled provisions on the Warsaw Treaty military doctrine exemplify the new political thinking on issues of war and peace in the nuclear age and on problems of defence and equal security for all states. They fully accord with the interests of the socialist community as a whole and the national interests of each of the allied socialist countries, and do not run counter to the interests of any other state.

Why the need to issue the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty states? What are its main features? How do the doctrine's provisions fit in with the military development of the Warsaw Treaty countries? All these questions evoke particular interest, since they reveal the goals and intentions of the allied socialist states and the essence of the new philosophy of security in the nuclear and space age.

The military doctrine of each state stems from its social system and policy and defines its attitude to the fundamental questions of war and peace. Inasmuch as major military-political alliances of states are a political reality in today's world and even stand opposed to one another, in addition to the national doctrines of the states comprising them, each of these alliances can have a general military doctrine.

The Warsaw Treaty Organisation is a qualitatively new socio-historical phenomenon that inevitably arose to defend the socialist gains of the working people from encroachments on the part of the aggressive forces of imperialism. The entire history of the Warsaw Treaty defensive alliance incontrovertibly proves that the socialist community countries have never threatened anyone and have never intended to attack anyone. Peace, not war, is needed for the building of socialism and communism. The peaceable policy of the allied socialist states determines precisely the nature of their military doctrine, which underlies the defensive activity of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and mirrors the community of defensive military-political goals of the fraternal countries.

The basic provisions of the military doctrine obtain from the policy of the communist and workers' parties of the Warsaw Treaty states. By officially setting forth today an integral military doctrine, the fraternal socialist countries are once again revealing to the world community their approach to war, peace and security in the context of the realities of the nuclear age. This approach is based on a profound understanding of the fact that in the present-day situation, where the huge stockpiled arsenals of nuclear weapons pose a threat to the very existence of humanity, nuclear war cannot be a means for attaining political goals. "Today," General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev points out, "it has become crystal-clear to everyone that old notions of war as a means of achieving political goals have become outmoded. In the nuclear age these outmoded dogmas breed a policy which can lead to a universal conflagration."

The nuclear threat is hanging over all and survival has become mankind's main concern. Aware of this, the allied socialist countries believe that today there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence, equitable cooperation and mutual understanding between all states. In present-day conditions competition between capitalism and socialism must only be peaceful.

The new situation requires a new approach to international security. The allied socialist countries are convinced that genuine security of every state and of the world as a whole depends not on the further growth of nuclear potentials or the development of new weapons of mass destruction but on cooperation between all states in bringing about a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world. However, this thesis is rejected by the U.S. administration. It has not given up its hegemonist policy or its plans for social revenge and continues to count on the illusory benefits of power politics, fiercely resisting the new policy pursued by the socialist countries. This creates the risk of war and dangerous tensions in the world.

The decision of the Warsaw Treaty countries to make public their military doctrine has been prompted by the need to lessen these tensions by adopting measures that would help reduce troops and armaments, lower the risk of war and strengthen confidence. This makes it very important to properly understand the nature of military doctrines, because they testify to the aims and intentions of states and military-political alliances in the military sphere. The socialist countries propose that Warsaw Treaty and NATO experts meet, discuss without bias and explain to one another the substance and aims of their military doctrines, compare concepts and jointly study and try to reach agreement on their further evolution. That was one of the reasons why the Warsaw Treaty countries decided to publish their military doctrine. They suggest that the sides ascertain the sincerity of each other's aims and intentions and expect that at consultations the NATO countries will produce evidence confirming the sincerity of their leaders' assurances that they will use force only in response to aggression.

Inviting representatives of the NATO countries to compare the military doctrines of the two military-political alliances, the Warsaw Treaty countries explain the fundamental provisions and features of their doctrine, which testify to its defensive orientation.

The main aim of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty countries and of the military doctrine of every Warsaw Treaty member country is to solve the cardinal problem facing mankind—the prevention of a nuclear and conventional war. Owing to their social system and peaceful policy, the allied socialist countries have never pinned their hopes for the future on military solutions of international problems. Now, under conditions of a nuclear confrontation, the solution of problems by military means is just impermissible. That is why the socialist countries insist that all international disputes be settled by peaceful, political means. Our military doctrine is a system of fundamental views on how to avert war, develop military capabilities and make a country and its armed forces ready to repel aggression. It also explains the methods of waging armed struggle in defence of socialism.

This means that the military doctrine of the socialist countries aims at preventing war and strengthening universal security. As the classics of Marxism-Leninism repeatedly stated, the Communists' aim is to rid society of the threat of war once and for all. Guided by the Marxist-Leninist teaching, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the communist parties of the other socialist countries believe that however great the threat to peace created by the policy of imperialism's aggressive forces, it is possible to avert war and save mankind from nuclear catastrophe. This is the historic mission of socialism and of all the progressive, peace-loving forces in the world.

The major feature of the Warsaw Treaty's military doctrine is its defensive character. Where does this manifest itself? In all our practical activity, domestic and foreign policy, and in military building.

The allied socialist states have declared to mankind that they will never, under any circumstances, be the first to start military actions against any state or an alliance of states unless they themselves become the target of armed attack and that they will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The USSR and other socialist countries have no territorial claims on any state in Europe or outside of it. The countries of the socialist community treat not a single nation or people as their enemy. On the contrary, they are ready to base relations with all the countries without exception on a mutual consideration of the interests of security and peaceful coexistence.

The defensive orientation of the doctrine finds an immediate reflection in the field of the Warsaw Treaty countries' military building. Thus, the commitments not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to start military actions were and remain an indispensable requirement

in military building of the USSR and other Warsaw Treaty countries. It is realised in the practice of training staffs and troops, in the organisation of the strictest control, aimed at preventing the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons—from tactical to strategic, in enhancing the battle readiness of the armed forces for the repulsion of aggression, in their technical equipment, in the streamlining of control and communications, and in raising the morale of personnel.

All this is not a verbal assurance, but the specific programme of the Warsaw Treaty for building armed forces. At its base lies the principle of sufficiency for defence. What does this mean? Generally it means having just as many armed forces as is necessary for defence from an outside attack. It means specifically that the personnel of the armed forces, and the amount and quality of means of armed struggle are strictly commensurate with the level of military threat, and the character and intensiveness of the military preparations of imperialism; they are determined by the requirements necessary for assuring the safety of the Warsaw Treaty countries and for repulsing aggression. At the Political Consultative Committee meeting in Berlin it was stressed that the armed forces of the allied states are being kept in a state of battle readiness sufficient for avoiding a surprise attack. Should they nevertheless be attacked, they will give a crushing rebuff to the aggressor.

Averting war and being ready to repulse the aggressor—these two tasks are mutually related and stem from the fact that the United States and NATO do not renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, are building up their strategic offensive potential on a vast scale in a bid to gain military superiority. In practice we constantly encounter the power politics of the North Atlantic Alliance, aimed at an arms race and at preparations for war. U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger almost daily advocates a buildup of military preparations and a "struggle between the free world and communism." Threatening the socialist countries, he calls not for peaceful coexistence, but only for an "armed truce" in relations between the East and West. Behind this stand not words, but mountains of weapons, programmes to produce new, still more destructive types of arms, and the directives for their use.

The allied socialist states cannot but take all this into account. For it involves plans of encroachment on their sovereignty and independence. Therefore the Warsaw Treaty states regard the reliable assuring of their security as a prime duty to their peoples. For this purpose they must have an appropriate defensive potential and modern armed forces and armaments capable of protecting the peaceful work and peaceful life of people. The whole defence readiness system of the Warsaw Treaty is built in such a way as to halt the aggressor, wrest his criminal plans and, if aggression against any of the Treaty participants does become a fact through the imperialists' fault, decisively repulse it.

Any claims that the aggressor may remain unpunished are altogether groundless. We keep a watchful eye on the military preparations of the United States and NATO, perceive and properly assess the dangerous trends which emerge in this process, and in this connection see to it that our defence potential develops appropriately. When we speak about maintaining the armed forces, our military potential within the limits of reasonable sufficiency, we mean that at the present stage the essence of sufficiency for the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union is determined by the need to prevent an unpunished nuclear attack in any, even the most unfavourable situation. As far as conventional weapons are concerned, sufficiency envisages an amount and quality of armed forces and armaments which would be enough to reliably ensure collective defence of the socialist community. The limits of sufficiency are determined not by us but by the actions of the United States and NATO. The Warsaw Treaty member states do not strive for military superiority and do not claim greater security than other countries but they will never agree to lesser security and will never tolerate military superiority over them.

The existing military-strategic parity remains the decisive factor of preventing war. In the context of the huge destructive power of modern weapons, nuclear and conventional, the existing approximate balance of the military forces of the two alliances makes a war between them senseless. The parity ensures the possibility of taking retaliatory actions in any situation and doing unacceptable damage to the aggressor.

Does this mean that, as the level of military equilibrium rises, the strategic situation in the world will remain stable and security—reliable? No, not at all. Conversely, as experience shows, the further enhancement of the level of parity does not bring greater security. The continuation of the arms race inevitably increases the war danger and can bring it to the limits when even parity would cease to be a factor of military-strategic deterrence. That is why the task of outlawing nuclear weapons, eliminating them and other weapons of mass destruction stage by stage, and drastically reducing the military confrontation is becoming ever more pressing. Proceeding from the principle of sufficiency, the Warsaw Treaty member states propose reducing the military potentials, of course on a mutual basis, down to the level when neither side, while ensuring its defence, would have forces and means for offensive actions.

Basing themselves on their defensive doctrine, the USSR and Warsaw Treaty states are persistently working to attain objectives aimed at stopping the arms race, achieving specific results in the sphere of disarmament, and eliminating the nuclear threat. They prove this by their practical deeds.

For a year and a half the Soviet Union did not conduct nuclear tests while the United States was intensifying its explosions in Nevada. Today, too, we are ready to halt the nuclear tests on a mutual basis on any day and in any month. As is known, the United States does not want to stop nuclear tests.

The Soviet Union has done everything to create real opportunities for concluding an agreement on medium-range and enhanced-range tactical missiles. It has made serious compromises by agreeing not to take into account the British and French nuclear missiles and by putting off the issue of medium-range air forces.

Bearing in mind the security interests of the Asian states, the USSR expressed its readiness to scrap all its medium-range and enhanced-range tactical missiles not only in Europe but also in the Asian part of the USSR, provided, of course, that the United States does the same. It must be noted here that the USSR leaves aside the question of all other U.S. nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, we hope that the United States will refrain from building up its nuclear potential in that region.

Owing to this far-reaching Soviet initiative there is nothing to prevent the nuclear powers now from taking the first step towards major nuclear arms reductions, which would probably pave the way for other, even larger agreements. Everything now depends on the United States and NATO.

Also on the negotiating table are the other constructive Soviet proposals: on radical (by 50 percent) strategic offensive arms reductions by the USSR and the United States with a simultaneous reinforcement of the regime of the ABM Treaty, including a ban on all tests of space components of ABM systems in outer space; on full cessation of nuclear testing with strict international verification, including on-site inspections; on the banning and scrapping of chemical and other mass destruction weapons.

A special role in practical actions by the Warsaw Treaty nations is rightfully assigned to Europe, a region where large groups of the armed forces of the two military-political alliances directly confront each other and where two world wars had earlier begun in this century. To reduce the level of that military confrontation, the socialist countries at their Budapest conference in June 1986 came up with a proposal for sizable reductions of the armed forces, tactical nuclear and conventional armaments in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. Regrettably, the NATO countries have not given any answer to that proposal.

The socialist countries proceed from the conviction that the arms reduction process must be continuous so as to rule out the very military-technical possibility of attack by either side. Any other approach in that process is inadmissible, just as it is inadmissible in reducing some types of armaments to launch the arms race in other directions. The allied socialist states are urging the NATO countries to display self-restraint in the military sphere and to give up the use of military force on a reciprocal basis.

They also believe that there is a chance to resolve such a crucial problem that preoccupies the European nations today as the limitation of the sides' opportunities for a surprise attack. To that end they are suggesting concrete measures such as reducing the concentration of troops and armaments in the zone of direct contact of the two military alliances to an agreed minimum level; removing from that zone the more dangerous, offensive arms systems; building a 300-kilometre-wide nuclear-free corridor along the Warsaw Treaty-NATO line of contact (up to 150 kilometres deep into each side's territory) and removing all nuclear weapons from that corridor on a reciprocal basis; setting up in Europe zones free from nuclear and chemical weapons and zones of reduced arms concentration and higher mutual confidence. All these proposals, however, have been turned down by NATO.

The socialist countries call on other nations, especially the NATO states, to compare their military doctrines with that of the Warsaw Treaty. NATO countries allege that their military doctrine, one of "flexible response" with an emphasis on the first nuclear strike, is also defensive. However, this can deceive only simpletons. We see that the United States and its NATO partners are persistently trying to enhance their security not in cooperation with other countries but, at the latter's expense and secure military superiority through the arms race, in particular by extending it to new areas. Hence their refusal to start real nuclear disarmament and to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, their regular major military exercises near the borders of socialist states and their stepping up tensions on various regions. None of this tallies with allegations that their doctrine is defensive.

The NATO doctrine of "nuclear deterrence" also has nothing to do with defence. Why? Rooted in the cold-war period, this doctrine is self-contradictory and dangerous. After all you cannot simultaneously admit that a nuclear conflict would lead to a holocaust and insist on preserving nuclear weapons as a peace-keeper. The NATO doctrine blocks resolution of the nuclear problem. Encouraging the arms race, it stimulates the stockpiling of deadly weapons, makes the military equilibrium fragile and increases the risk of a nuclear war.

Responsibility for international tension lies primarily with the United States. Reluctant to give up the arms race, the U.S. ruling circles intend to deploy weapons in outer space to threaten the whole of mankind from there. Theirs is a double-standard policy. While paying lip-service to strategic stability and an atmosphere of trust, they are encroaching upon the parity, steering for a military superiority and greater asymmetry in armaments and military personnel of the sides. The extensive war preparations by the United States and its NATO allies, their growing military presence near the USSR and other socialist countries, unending provocative violations of their air space and sea borders, delirious schemes to dismantle the social system in the socialist countries and other hostile imperialist activities undermine peace and security everywhere.

Of late, with Washington's prompting, the West has been going out of its way to present the certain flaws in organising our airspace combat patrolling as a weakness of the Soviet Armed Forces and encourage some hot-heads to test our security in other areas.

To put it bluntly, we wouldn't advise anyone to check our strength. Our answer to provocations is the growing defensive might of the Warsaw Treaty states and the rising vigilance and combat readiness of their armed forces.

This refers, in the first place, to the personnel on combat duty and their arms and equipment. These forces are able and ready to act in any situation at any time.

Geared exclusively to repulsing the external military threat, the Warsaw Treaty defensive military doctrine does not mean that we will be passive. We will rely on the firm foundation of Lenin's teaching about the defence of the socialist homeland. Together with the armies of our socialist allies, the Soviet Armed Forces will most resolutely uphold our socialist achievements against aggression. The security of our homeland and that of the socialist community as a whole is sacred to us.

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Obituary: Col Gen Avn V. D. Lavrinenkov
18010098 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
16 Jan 88 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Vladimir Dmitriyevich Lavrinenkov"]

[Excerpts] Following a brief illness Colonel General of Aviation Lavrinenkov, Vladimir Dmitriyevich, an active participant in the Great Patriotic War and Twice Hero of the Soviet Union has died....

V.D. Lavrinenkov was born on 17 May 1919 in the village of Ptakhino, now of Pochinkovskiy rayon, Smolensk oblast into the family of a peasant. His own labor activity began in 1934. In 1940 he voluntarily entered the ranks of the Soviet Armed forces, where he followed a great path from flight-school cadet to Colonel General of Aviation.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War...he commanded a squadron and a fighter aviation regiment....

During the post-war years V. D. Lavrinenkov served in various command positions in the Air Defense Forces. In 1954 he completed [studies at] the K. Ye. Voroshilov General Staff Academy of the USSR Armed Forces. From 1977 to 1984 he was chief of staff and deputy chief of Civil Defense of the Ukrainian SSR. In recent years V. D. Lavrinenkov served in the Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilyevskiy Military Academy of the PVO of the Ground Forces.

V.V. Shcherbitskiy, D.T. Yazov, V.S. Shevchenko, V.A. Maslov, S.F. Akhromeyev, V.G. Kulikov, P.G. Lushev, A.D. Lizichev, Yu. P. Maksimov, Ye. F. Ivanovskiy, I.M. Tretyak, A.N. Yefimov, V.N. Chernavin, M.I. Sorokin, S.K. Kurkotkin, V.M. Shcherbakov, N.F. Shestopalov, V.L. Govorov, D.S. Sukhorukhov, I.A. Gerasimov, V.A. Silakov, B.V. Litvinov, I.M. Maltsev, A.G. Smirnov, V.V. Osipov, V.A. Sharygin, M.N. Kalinin, Yu. T. Chesnokov, A.I. Koldunov, V.A. Prudnikov, N.S. Bondarchuk, B.I. Dukhov, M.V. Stepanyuk.

U.S. Research on Improvement of Accuracy of SLBMs

81442536 Moscow *MORSKOY SBORNIK* in Russian
No 1, Jan 88 pp 77-79

[Article by Capt 2d Rank V. Kozhevnikov entitled:
"Wager on a First Strike"]

[Text] The American military command is devoting great attention to sea based nuclear missile forces which form a component part of the so-called strategic triad. Along with the construction of new nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), an increase in the reliability in command, control, and communication systems, and the improvement of basing and material-technical support, the improvement in the accuracy of sub-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) is given special attention. They are seen by the Pentagon as a means of a first, disarming strike, capable of destroying highly protected small-scale targets: ICBM silos, command centers, and other objectives.

As the newspaper 'Navy Times' indicates, for the destruction of a target hardened to 500 kg/cm² using a single missile with 88 percent [kill] probability, a 475 kt¹ nuclear charge accurate to within (CEP) 122 meters is needed.

In the framework of the Trident program which was undertaken in 1971, the Trident-1 S-4 was developed to replace the Poseidon S-3, a single warhead which produced a 50 kt blast with a CEP of 450-500 meters. Today, 12 Lafayette class and 8 Ohio class SSBNs are armed with Trident-1 missiles. They have a 7,000 kilometer range, 7 or 8 100-150 kt warheads, and improved accuracy to 300 meters CEP. However even these specifications did not satisfy the demands of the Pentagon and work on their improvement was continued.

On 15 January 1987 the U.S. conducted its first test launch of the new Trident-2 D-5 missile. According to the announcement made by American representatives, it has a range exceeding 12,000 kilometers and a CEP of 120 meters. According to plans, the rocket will be armed with 10 475 kt warheads.

In the 70s, the U.S. Navy embarked on a program (IAP—the Improved Accuracy Program) to increase the accuracy of SLBMs. This work is being conducted along the following fundamental lines:

- investigation of the possibilities for a satellite navigation system, "Navstar"
- research and development of new non-traditional methods of problem solving
- improvement of the SLBM on-board navigation equipment
- creation of new missile guidance systems

The satellite navigation system, "Navstar," allows moving objects to determine their position along three coordinates with an accuracy within 16 to 30 meters and determine their speed to within 0.1 meter/sec. According to the foreign press, Navstar systems will be introduced on SSBNs, including the Ohio class beginning at the end of the 80's. This will increase the accuracy of fire in unequipped regions of the world's oceans by 30-50%. Also being studied are the possibilities of increasing accuracy by installing Navstar systems on the Trident missiles themselves.

However, considering that in time of war the satellite navigation system would be shortlived and that it places in jeopardy the secrecy of patrolling SSBNs, the U.S. Naval command intends to limit its operational use. According to the foreign press, the Navstar system will become the primary source of accurate information during flight-design tests of the Trident-2 missile and throughout completion of the IAP programs.

Nearly 100 nontraditional systems and methods of increasing the accuracy of SLBMs have been reviewed. Several of these have been recognized as unrealistic, others are seen as possible candidates for implementation. Included in the latter are systems which use various transmitters for guiding the missile during passive parts of the flight: laser guidance based on a passive satellite position-fixing system [lazernyy, otslezhivaiushchiy passivnyy sputnik]; horizon guidance measuring the dispersion of starlight in the atmosphere [gorizonta, ismeriaiushchiy rasseianny v atmosfere svet zvezd]. Work on a whole series of projects has proceeded to the point of creation of experimental prototypes which have already undergone testing or will in the near future. This includes the underwater hydroacoustic transponders (VMS-Velocity Measuring Sonars), designated for determination of the coordinates and the speed of submarines relative to the sea floor. They are intended for use immediately prior to launching of the missiles. According to the foreign press, these transponders are already being put into place in areas where Trident armed SSBNs patrol. A navigational system which would make possible correction of on-board SSBN inertial equipment using the relief of the sea floor is at a similar stage of development. Its principle of operation is based on acoustic soundings of the sea floor and a comparison of the received contour with zonal maps of the sea floor held in the memory of the on board navigational computer. Use of such a method would ensure a high degree of accuracy in the determination of location and the preservation of secrecy for patrolling SSBNs. However it requires in addition to the apparatus for surveying the sea floor, the possession of "precise bathymetric navigational zonal maps" of the sea floor covering an area of 13 million km².

In the U.S. the study of the effect of gravity on the inertial navigational systems of SSBNs and missiles in flight is receiving great attention. Results of similar

research in the U.S. Air Force² have convinced specialists regarding the necessity of the study of gravitation and the creation of gravitational navigation systems for an increase in accuracy in the specifications of the Trident missile system. The Defense Mapping Agency is compiling and systematically refining global gravitational models using satellite-acquired information, as well as land based and sea based geodesic measuring devices. A gravitational navigation system for SSBNs has recently been built and tested. It includes a gravimeter (measurement of gravitational fields) and a gradientometer (measurement of the increments comprising gravitational fields). Installation of gravitational navigation systems on Ohio class subs is planned for the end of the 80s.

An increase in the accuracy of the SSBN location determination capabilities with the help of on board inertial navigation systems (SINS)³ is for the most part proceeding down the path of their perfection. Thus the approval for installation of the SINS Mark 2 model 7 (Ohio class SSBN) achieved an approximately sixfold improvement in the accuracy of coordinate determination when compared with the Mark 2 model 0 (George Washington class SSBN). This allowed for less frequent surfacing of the SSBN (every 100 hours rather than every 8 to 15) for correction of the on board navigation devices using the satellite navigation systems.

In order to increase the accuracy of the Trident missile's specifications, they are being equipped with astroinertial guidance systems. According to the foreign press, astro-correction takes place during the passive phase of flight at the stage of the separation of warheads by means of the observation of one or two stars located near the zenith in the region of the target. This allows for a significant decrease in error in targeting accuracy of the SLBM. For astronavigational measurements, the Trident missiles are being equipped with an optical telescope and a star sensor with a vidicon.

According to American specialists, the planned equipping of the Trident-2 SLBMs with MARV type reentry vehicles will require a further perfection in the missile guidance system to attain the desired accuracy. One of the ways to achieve this is the autonomous guidance of the reentry vehicles during the final stage of the flight trajectory. This can be attained using data on local surface configuration (TERCOM) or data on target region magnetic fields (MAGCOM). After flight-design tests including 20 ground launches from Cape Canaveral and 10 launches from a submerged SSBN, the Trident-2 SLBMs will become part of the arsenal. SSBNs will be armed with them beginning in 1989. In the future, 8 of the first Ohio class SSBNs, currently armed with Trident-1 missiles, will be rearmed with the Trident-2. According to former Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger, an increase in the accuracy and firepower of the warheads will allow U.S. nuclear submarine forces to "threaten the enemy's hardened targets (ICBM silos and administrative centers) with destruction." In this disclosure the true significance of the Trident system can be seen: it is a weapon of aggression, of a first strike, and unequivocally not a means of defense or restraint as the unenlightened members of the bourgeoisie media try to establish.

Footnotes

1. A decrease in the power of a nuclear charge to 300 kt while maintaining accuracy decreases the kill probability of destruction to 55 percent.
2. An increase in the precision of the models of the gravitational fields allows for a decrease in the circular error probable of the ICBM from 370 to 230 meters.
3. 10 mm diameter Beryl spheres electrostatically raised in a vacuum and rotating in a magnetic field at a speed of 2,500 to 3,600 revolutions per second are a most important element in the contemporary SINS system.

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